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Current Tax Treaty Issues : 50th Anniversary of the International Tax Group.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: EC and International Tax Law SeriesPublisher: Amsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, 2020Copyright date: ©2020Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (729 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9789087225971
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Current Tax Treaty IssuesDDC classification:
  • 341.48399999999998
LOC classification:
  • K4475 .C877 2020
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- Chapter 1: A History of the International Tax Group -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. The background scene in the 1970s -- 1.3. Communication -- 1.4. Collaboration -- 1.5. Topics -- 1.6. Appendices -- Part One: Treaty Policy and General Considerations -- Chapter 2: Writing Tax Treaty History -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. How? -- 2.2.1. Publications of international organizations -- 2.2.2. Archives of international organizations -- 2.2.3. Treaty practice -- 2.2.4. Country tax history -- 2.2.5. Significant persons -- 2.2.6. Language and legal culture -- 2.3. Why? -- 2.3.1. Applying the law -- 2.3.2. Developing tax policy -- 2.3.3. Matching with theories -- 2.3.4. Historiography -- 2.4 Where are we with tax treaty history? -- Chapter 3: International Tax Policy and International Tax Institutions: Never the Twain? -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. The beginning: League of Nations 1920-1946 -- 3.2.1. 1920-1928 -- 3.2.2. 1929-1946 -- 3.3. Snapshots 1946-1990 -- 3.3.1. United Nations 1946-1954 -- 3.3.2. OEEC/OECD 1954-1990 -- 3.3.3. International Monetary Fund 1944-1990 -- 3.3.4. United Nations 1967-1990 -- 3.4. The new international tax world? OECD, Global Forum on Transparency, Inclusive Framework, UN, IMF, 1991-2020 -- 3.4.1. Politics -- 3.4.2. Economics and international tax policy -- 3.4.3. Transition from business as usual to new, larger and combined projects -- 3.4.4. Convergence and emergence of international tax institutions -- 3.4.5. A new international tax order? -- Chapter 4: Four Comparisons of Tax Litigation between the Netherlands and the UK -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Administrative law or not -- 4.3. The meaning of "binding" -- 4.3.1. Common law: United Kingdom -- 4.3.2. Civil law: Netherlands -- 4.3.3. A comparison -- 4.4. Burden of proof.
4.5. The use of supplementary materials in interpreting the law -- 4.5.1. Netherlands -- 4.5.1.1. Interpreting tax treaties -- 4.5.2. United Kingdom -- 4.5.3. Comparison -- Chapter 5: Preservation Principle -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Status of discussions about the Preservation Principle -- 5.2.1. Japan -- 5.2.2. United States and Canada -- 5.2.3. Other countries -- 5.3. Analysis of Preservation Principle in general -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. Dualism and monism -- 5.3.3. Hierarchical rank of income tax treaties -- 5.3.4. Three related but different interpretation issues of income tax treaties -- 5.3.4.1. Introduction -- 5.3.4.2. Three issues identified -- 5.3.4.3. First Issue: Direct taxing power -- 5.3.4.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.4.3.2. Countries having the view that income tax treaties have no direct taxing power -- 5.3.4.3.2.1. Grouping of legal grounds -- 5.3.4.3.2.2. Constitutional reasons -- 5.3.4.3.2.3. Legislative reasons -- 5.3.4.3.2.4. Other reasons -- 5.3.4.3.3. France has a unique position -- 5.3.4.4. Second Issue: Exclusively relieving -- 5.3.4.4.1. France's position -- 5.3.4.4.2. Countries having the view that treaties are not always relieving -- 5.3.4.4.3. Countries having the view that treaties are exclusively relieving -- 5.3.4.5. Third Issue: Preservation Principle in the narrow sense -- 5.3.4.5.1. Introduction -- 5.3.4.5.2. Countries making substantive discussions about the Preservation Principle -- 5.3.4.5.2.1. United States -- 5.3.4.5.2.2. Japan -- 5.3.4.5.2.3. Canada -- 5.3.4.5.2.4. Summary -- 5.3.4.5.3. Countries making no substantive discussions on the Preservation Principle -- 5.3.4.6. Summary -- 5.4. Change of source rule -- 5.4.1. Introduction -- 5.4.2. Example 1 -- 5.4.3. Analysis -- 5.4.3.1. Australia's analysis -- 5.4.3.2. India's analysis -- 5.4.3.3. Comparative analysis -- 5.4.3.3.1. Introduction.
5.4.3.3.2. Countries having domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty source rules -- 5.4.3.3.3. Countries having no domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty source rules -- 5.5. PE threshold tests -- 5.5.1. Introduction -- 5.5.2. Example 2 -- 5.5.3. Analysis -- 5.5.3.1. United States' analysis -- 5.5.3.2. Japan's analysis -- 5.5.3.3. Comparative analysis -- 5.5.3.3.1. Introduction -- 5.5.3.3.2. Countries having domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty provisions -- 5.5.3.3.3. Countries having no domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty provisions -- 5.5.3.3.3.1. Countries requiring the Consistency Rule -- 5.5.3.3.3.2. Countries granting most favourable result to taxpayers -- 5.5.3.3.4. Summary -- 5.5.3.4. Implication of BEPS Project preventing artificial avoidance of PE status -- 5.6. Taxation on business profits - Application of the AOA -- 5.6.1. Introduction -- 5.6.2. Example 3 -- 5.6.3. Analysis -- 5.6.3.1. Japan's analysis -- 5.6.3.2. Netherland's analysis -- 5.6.3.3. Comparative analysis -- 5.7. Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Constitutional Issues in Developing International Tax Norms: A Swedish Perspective -- 6.1. The issue -- 6.2. The OECD -- 6.3. The European Union -- 6.4. The Swedish tax legislative process -- 6.4.1. The normal procedure -- 6.4.2. The procedure in EU-related tax legislation -- 6.4.3. The procedure with respect to tax treaties -- 6.5. Discussion -- Part Two: Treaty Definitions -- Chapter 7: Taxation of States under Tax Treaties -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Tax treaty status of the (home) state -- 7.2.1. The state as a "person" -- 7.2.1.1. The state as "Contracting State" under the OECD Model (1963) -- 7.2.1.2. The state as including other states or territories under article 30 OECD Model (territorial extension).
7.2.1.3. The "State" excluding certain territories or possessions -- 7.2.1.4. The confirmatory definition of "State" -- 7.2.1.5. The "State" in "geographical sense" -- 7.2.1.6. Conclusion -- 7.2.2. The state as a "company" -- 7.2.2.1. The state as a "body corporate" -- 7.2.2.2. Territories not enjoying statehood -- 7.2.2.3. Territories having statehood under international law that are not recognized by the other contracting state -- 7.2.3. The state as a "resident" -- 7.2.3.1. The "liable to tax" test -- 7.2.3.2. The state as a treaty "resident" by virtue of the 1995 revision to article 4(1) OECD Model -- 7.2.3.3. The meaning of "political subdivisions" and "local authorities" -- 7.2.3.3.1. In general -- 7.2.3.3.2. Can one entirely disregard the law of the state to which the "political subdivision" or "local authority" belongs? -- 7.2.3.3.3. "Constituent units" of federal states -- 7.2.3.4. "Agency and instrumentality", "statutory body" and other state-owned entities -- 7.2.3.4.1. In general -- 7.2.3.4.2. The domestic law general meaning -- 7.2.3.4.3. The "context" requiring a different interpretation -- 7.2.4. Treaty practice -- 7.2.5. Treaty definitions of "statutory body, "agency" and "instrumentality" -- 7.2.6. Non-discrimination -- 7.3. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Limitations on Treaty Access by or through Commercial Entities -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.1.1. Selection and scope of topic -- 8.1.2. Key themes -- 8.1.3. Reasons for limiting access (the problem) -- 8.1.4. Historical background of provisions specifically limiting treaty access -- 8.1.4.1. Pre-BEPS measures -- 8.1.4.2. BEPS initiative and thereafter -- 8.2. Anti-conduit test (ACT) -- 8.2.1. Theoretical groundings -- 8.2.2. Historical background -- 8.2.3. Approaches to address conduit treaty shopping -- 8.2.3.1. Administrative determinations and judicial decisions.
8.2.3.2. Statutory and regulatory approaches -- 8.2.3.3. Treaty approaches -- 8.2.4. Relationship to international law -- 8.2.4.1. General -- 8.2.4.2. Theory of treaty interpretation -- 8.3. Principal purpose test (PPT) -- 8.3.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.3.2. Historical background of the PPT -- 8.3.2.1. Treaty usage -- 8.3.2.2. Case law -- 8.3.3. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.3.3.1. General -- 8.3.3.2. What do the examples tell us? -- 8.3.3.3. PPT discretionary fallback relief provision -- 8.3.4. Relationship to international law -- 8.3.5. EU freedoms -- 8.4. Limitation on benefits test (LOBT) -- 8.4.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.2. Historical background of the LOBT -- 8.4.3. Overview -- 8.4.4. Publicly traded entity -- 8.4.4.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.4.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.5. 50% ownership/base erosion -- 8.4.5.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.5.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.6. Active business -- 8.4.6.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.6.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.7. Derivative benefits -- 8.4.7.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.7.2. Text and discussion -- 8.4.8. Discretionary relief -- 8.4.8.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.8.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.8.3. Administrative practice and jurisprudence -- 8.4.9. EU freedoms -- 8.5. Fault lines -- 8.5.1. Holding company -- 8.5.2. Financing company -- 8.5.3. IP company -- 8.5.4. CIV -- 8.5.5. Private equity and other private non-CIV funds -- 8.5.6. Investment manager -- 8.5.7. Preferential tax regimes -- 8.6. Assessment/comparison of regimes -- 8.6.1. PPT -- 8.6.2. LOBT -- 8.6.3. Alternatives to the Action 6/MLI proposals -- 8.7. Conclusion -- Chapter 9: Interpretation vs Qualification -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Article 3(2) OECD Model -- 9.3. Interpretation vs qualification.
9.4. Definitional provisions and deeming rules under domestic laws.
Summary: This book presents a unique and detailed insight into the most controversial issues which may be found in the tax treaty context.
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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- Chapter 1: A History of the International Tax Group -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. The background scene in the 1970s -- 1.3. Communication -- 1.4. Collaboration -- 1.5. Topics -- 1.6. Appendices -- Part One: Treaty Policy and General Considerations -- Chapter 2: Writing Tax Treaty History -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. How? -- 2.2.1. Publications of international organizations -- 2.2.2. Archives of international organizations -- 2.2.3. Treaty practice -- 2.2.4. Country tax history -- 2.2.5. Significant persons -- 2.2.6. Language and legal culture -- 2.3. Why? -- 2.3.1. Applying the law -- 2.3.2. Developing tax policy -- 2.3.3. Matching with theories -- 2.3.4. Historiography -- 2.4 Where are we with tax treaty history? -- Chapter 3: International Tax Policy and International Tax Institutions: Never the Twain? -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. The beginning: League of Nations 1920-1946 -- 3.2.1. 1920-1928 -- 3.2.2. 1929-1946 -- 3.3. Snapshots 1946-1990 -- 3.3.1. United Nations 1946-1954 -- 3.3.2. OEEC/OECD 1954-1990 -- 3.3.3. International Monetary Fund 1944-1990 -- 3.3.4. United Nations 1967-1990 -- 3.4. The new international tax world? OECD, Global Forum on Transparency, Inclusive Framework, UN, IMF, 1991-2020 -- 3.4.1. Politics -- 3.4.2. Economics and international tax policy -- 3.4.3. Transition from business as usual to new, larger and combined projects -- 3.4.4. Convergence and emergence of international tax institutions -- 3.4.5. A new international tax order? -- Chapter 4: Four Comparisons of Tax Litigation between the Netherlands and the UK -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Administrative law or not -- 4.3. The meaning of "binding" -- 4.3.1. Common law: United Kingdom -- 4.3.2. Civil law: Netherlands -- 4.3.3. A comparison -- 4.4. Burden of proof.

4.5. The use of supplementary materials in interpreting the law -- 4.5.1. Netherlands -- 4.5.1.1. Interpreting tax treaties -- 4.5.2. United Kingdom -- 4.5.3. Comparison -- Chapter 5: Preservation Principle -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Status of discussions about the Preservation Principle -- 5.2.1. Japan -- 5.2.2. United States and Canada -- 5.2.3. Other countries -- 5.3. Analysis of Preservation Principle in general -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. Dualism and monism -- 5.3.3. Hierarchical rank of income tax treaties -- 5.3.4. Three related but different interpretation issues of income tax treaties -- 5.3.4.1. Introduction -- 5.3.4.2. Three issues identified -- 5.3.4.3. First Issue: Direct taxing power -- 5.3.4.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.4.3.2. Countries having the view that income tax treaties have no direct taxing power -- 5.3.4.3.2.1. Grouping of legal grounds -- 5.3.4.3.2.2. Constitutional reasons -- 5.3.4.3.2.3. Legislative reasons -- 5.3.4.3.2.4. Other reasons -- 5.3.4.3.3. France has a unique position -- 5.3.4.4. Second Issue: Exclusively relieving -- 5.3.4.4.1. France's position -- 5.3.4.4.2. Countries having the view that treaties are not always relieving -- 5.3.4.4.3. Countries having the view that treaties are exclusively relieving -- 5.3.4.5. Third Issue: Preservation Principle in the narrow sense -- 5.3.4.5.1. Introduction -- 5.3.4.5.2. Countries making substantive discussions about the Preservation Principle -- 5.3.4.5.2.1. United States -- 5.3.4.5.2.2. Japan -- 5.3.4.5.2.3. Canada -- 5.3.4.5.2.4. Summary -- 5.3.4.5.3. Countries making no substantive discussions on the Preservation Principle -- 5.3.4.6. Summary -- 5.4. Change of source rule -- 5.4.1. Introduction -- 5.4.2. Example 1 -- 5.4.3. Analysis -- 5.4.3.1. Australia's analysis -- 5.4.3.2. India's analysis -- 5.4.3.3. Comparative analysis -- 5.4.3.3.1. Introduction.

5.4.3.3.2. Countries having domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty source rules -- 5.4.3.3.3. Countries having no domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty source rules -- 5.5. PE threshold tests -- 5.5.1. Introduction -- 5.5.2. Example 2 -- 5.5.3. Analysis -- 5.5.3.1. United States' analysis -- 5.5.3.2. Japan's analysis -- 5.5.3.3. Comparative analysis -- 5.5.3.3.1. Introduction -- 5.5.3.3.2. Countries having domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty provisions -- 5.5.3.3.3. Countries having no domestic provisions to give effect to inconsistent treaty provisions -- 5.5.3.3.3.1. Countries requiring the Consistency Rule -- 5.5.3.3.3.2. Countries granting most favourable result to taxpayers -- 5.5.3.3.4. Summary -- 5.5.3.4. Implication of BEPS Project preventing artificial avoidance of PE status -- 5.6. Taxation on business profits - Application of the AOA -- 5.6.1. Introduction -- 5.6.2. Example 3 -- 5.6.3. Analysis -- 5.6.3.1. Japan's analysis -- 5.6.3.2. Netherland's analysis -- 5.6.3.3. Comparative analysis -- 5.7. Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Constitutional Issues in Developing International Tax Norms: A Swedish Perspective -- 6.1. The issue -- 6.2. The OECD -- 6.3. The European Union -- 6.4. The Swedish tax legislative process -- 6.4.1. The normal procedure -- 6.4.2. The procedure in EU-related tax legislation -- 6.4.3. The procedure with respect to tax treaties -- 6.5. Discussion -- Part Two: Treaty Definitions -- Chapter 7: Taxation of States under Tax Treaties -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Tax treaty status of the (home) state -- 7.2.1. The state as a "person" -- 7.2.1.1. The state as "Contracting State" under the OECD Model (1963) -- 7.2.1.2. The state as including other states or territories under article 30 OECD Model (territorial extension).

7.2.1.3. The "State" excluding certain territories or possessions -- 7.2.1.4. The confirmatory definition of "State" -- 7.2.1.5. The "State" in "geographical sense" -- 7.2.1.6. Conclusion -- 7.2.2. The state as a "company" -- 7.2.2.1. The state as a "body corporate" -- 7.2.2.2. Territories not enjoying statehood -- 7.2.2.3. Territories having statehood under international law that are not recognized by the other contracting state -- 7.2.3. The state as a "resident" -- 7.2.3.1. The "liable to tax" test -- 7.2.3.2. The state as a treaty "resident" by virtue of the 1995 revision to article 4(1) OECD Model -- 7.2.3.3. The meaning of "political subdivisions" and "local authorities" -- 7.2.3.3.1. In general -- 7.2.3.3.2. Can one entirely disregard the law of the state to which the "political subdivision" or "local authority" belongs? -- 7.2.3.3.3. "Constituent units" of federal states -- 7.2.3.4. "Agency and instrumentality", "statutory body" and other state-owned entities -- 7.2.3.4.1. In general -- 7.2.3.4.2. The domestic law general meaning -- 7.2.3.4.3. The "context" requiring a different interpretation -- 7.2.4. Treaty practice -- 7.2.5. Treaty definitions of "statutory body, "agency" and "instrumentality" -- 7.2.6. Non-discrimination -- 7.3. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Limitations on Treaty Access by or through Commercial Entities -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.1.1. Selection and scope of topic -- 8.1.2. Key themes -- 8.1.3. Reasons for limiting access (the problem) -- 8.1.4. Historical background of provisions specifically limiting treaty access -- 8.1.4.1. Pre-BEPS measures -- 8.1.4.2. BEPS initiative and thereafter -- 8.2. Anti-conduit test (ACT) -- 8.2.1. Theoretical groundings -- 8.2.2. Historical background -- 8.2.3. Approaches to address conduit treaty shopping -- 8.2.3.1. Administrative determinations and judicial decisions.

8.2.3.2. Statutory and regulatory approaches -- 8.2.3.3. Treaty approaches -- 8.2.4. Relationship to international law -- 8.2.4.1. General -- 8.2.4.2. Theory of treaty interpretation -- 8.3. Principal purpose test (PPT) -- 8.3.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.3.2. Historical background of the PPT -- 8.3.2.1. Treaty usage -- 8.3.2.2. Case law -- 8.3.3. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.3.3.1. General -- 8.3.3.2. What do the examples tell us? -- 8.3.3.3. PPT discretionary fallback relief provision -- 8.3.4. Relationship to international law -- 8.3.5. EU freedoms -- 8.4. Limitation on benefits test (LOBT) -- 8.4.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.2. Historical background of the LOBT -- 8.4.3. Overview -- 8.4.4. Publicly traded entity -- 8.4.4.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.4.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.5. 50% ownership/base erosion -- 8.4.5.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.5.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.6. Active business -- 8.4.6.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.6.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.7. Derivative benefits -- 8.4.7.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.7.2. Text and discussion -- 8.4.8. Discretionary relief -- 8.4.8.1. Theoretical grounding -- 8.4.8.2. Textual analysis and discussion -- 8.4.8.3. Administrative practice and jurisprudence -- 8.4.9. EU freedoms -- 8.5. Fault lines -- 8.5.1. Holding company -- 8.5.2. Financing company -- 8.5.3. IP company -- 8.5.4. CIV -- 8.5.5. Private equity and other private non-CIV funds -- 8.5.6. Investment manager -- 8.5.7. Preferential tax regimes -- 8.6. Assessment/comparison of regimes -- 8.6.1. PPT -- 8.6.2. LOBT -- 8.6.3. Alternatives to the Action 6/MLI proposals -- 8.7. Conclusion -- Chapter 9: Interpretation vs Qualification -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Article 3(2) OECD Model -- 9.3. Interpretation vs qualification.

9.4. Definitional provisions and deeming rules under domestic laws.

This book presents a unique and detailed insight into the most controversial issues which may be found in the tax treaty context.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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