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Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 : Bank Regulation and Supervision a Decade after the Global Financial Crisis.

Material type: TextTextSeries: Global Financial Development ReportPublisher: Chicago : World Bank Publications, 2019Copyright date: ©2019Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (155 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781464814969
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020DDC classification:
  • 346.082
LOC classification:
  • K1066
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations and Glossary -- Overview -- 1 Banking Regulation and Supervision: Conceptual Framework and Stylized Facts -- 2 Market Discipline -- 3 Bank Capital Regulation -- Statistical Appendixes -- A: Basic Data on Financial System Characteristics, 2015-17 -- B: Selected Indicators of Market Discipline, Capital Regulation, and Supervision -- Bibliography -- BOXES -- O.1 The World Bank's 2019 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey -- O.2 Main Messages of This Report -- O.3 Views on Regulation and Supervision by Practitioners: Financial Development Barometer -- O.4 Navigating This Report -- 1.1 Root Causes of the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis and Policy Lessons for Developing Countries -- 1.2 A Brief Historical Perspective on International Coordination and Harmonization in Banking Regulation and Supervision -- 1.3 Regulation and Supervision of Fintech Companies and Cybersecurity -- 1.4 Bank Resolution Cases: The Ukrainian Banking Crises -- 1.5 Use of Financial Technology in Banking Regulation and Supervision -- 1.6 Bank Regulation and Supervision 10 Years after the Global Financial Crisis -- 2.1 How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Stability? -- 2.2 Economic Costs of State Support during the Global Financial Crisis -- 2.3 Bank Resolution Cases: One Law with Different Applications by European Union Countries -- 2.4 Does Good Governance Lead to Financial Stability? -- 2.5 Shadow Banking in China -- 3.1 Types of Regulatory Capital -- 3.2 Capital as a Complement to Weak Supervisory Capacity -- 3.3 Is Bank Recapitalization an Effective Policy Tool for Banks in Distress? -- 3.4 Bank Capital: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis -- 3.5 Basel III -- 3.6 Adoption of Basel II and III in Developing Countries: Why and How? -- FIGURES.
BO.1.1 Geographic Coverage of Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, 2019 -- BO.3.1 Views on Postcrisis Regulations -- O.1 Deposit Insurance Systems Expanded since the Global Financial Crisis, by Country Income Group -- O.2 Better Bank Governance Is Associated with Higher Levels of Systemic Risk for Large Banks -- O.3 The Relationship between Bank Capital and Systemic Stability Is Stronger in Countries with Weaker Supervision -- O.4 Regulatory Capital-to-Asset Ratios over Time, 2004-18 -- O.5 Response of Bank Stock Returns to Lagged Bank Capital, 2006-08 -- O.6 Tier 1 Capital to Total Regulatory Capital, 2005-17 -- O.7 Share of Countries Following Each Basel Regime, by Country Income Group -- 1.1 Banks' Capital Requirements, 2008-16 -- 1.2 Leverage and Risk Weights of Large Banks versus Rest of National Banking Systems, 2005-15 -- 1.3 Quality and Definition of Regulatory Bank Capital -- 1.4 Definition of Regulatory Capital -- 1.5 Capital Regulations: Complementary Tools -- 1.6 Deposit Insurance Protection Scheme -- 1.7 Government Interventions to Rescue Banking Sectors -- 1.8 New Resolution Rules and Bail-In Debt Requirements -- 1.9 Banks' Disclosure of Risk Information -- 1.10 Information on Credit Ratings -- 1.11 Public Availability of Supervisory Reporting -- 1.12 Supervisory Powers -- 1.13 Supervisory Capacity -- 1.14 Basel Capital Framework Adoption and Basel II Implementation -- 1.15 Basel III Adoption and Implementation -- B1.6.1 Relation between Banking Crises and Bank Capital -- 2.1 Elements of Market Discipline -- 2.2 Increase in Deposit Insurance Coverage in Response to the Global Financial Crisis -- B2.2.1 Recapitalizations and Liquidity Support during Banking Crises, 2007-17 -- B2.2.2 Government Interventions in the European Union during Banking Crises, 2007-17 -- 2.3 Bank Sizes Worldwide and Regional Bank Concentrations.
2.4 New Rules for Systemically Important Banks -- 2.5 New Resolution Rules for Systemically Important Banks -- 2.6 Requirements Implemented for Resolving Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 2.7 Regulation of Systemic Risk in Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 2.8 Governance Reforms in Banks -- B2.4.1 Corporate Governance of Banks and Leverage -- B2.5.1 Substitution across Allocative Instruments in China -- 2.9 Bank Riskiness, Impaired Loans, and Provisions before and after the Global Financial Crisis, by Country Income Group -- B3.5.1 A Comparison of the Capital Requirements for Basel II and III -- 3.1 Percentage of Countries Following Each Basel Regime, by Region -- B3.6.1 Percentage of Countries Adopting the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Approach, by Region -- 3.2 Percentage of Countries with Capital Buffers, by Region -- 3.3 Percentage of Countries with a Leverage Ratio Requirement, by Region and Basel Regime -- 3.4 Percentage of Countries Allowing Items as Part of Tier 1 Capital, 2010 and 2016 -- 3.5 Tier 1 Capital to Total Regulatory Capital, by Country Income Group -- 3.6 Total Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets, by Country Income Group -- 3.7 Total Regulatory Capital to Total Assets (Leverage Ratio), by Country Income Group -- 3.8 Risk-Weighted Assets to Total Assets, by Country Income Group -- TABLES -- BO.3.1 Views on Net Impact of Postcrisis Regulatory Changes -- B2.1.1 Stand-Alone and Systemic Risk before and after Global Financial Crisis -- B3.1.1 Examples of Regulatory Capital Instruments and Key Characteristics -- 3.1 Key Characteristics of Basel I and II -- A.1 Economies and Their Financial System Characteristics, 2015-17 -- A.1.1 Depth-Financial Institutions -- A.1.2 Access-Financial Institutions -- A.1.3 Efficiency-Financial Institutions -- A.1.4 Stability-Financial Institutions.
A.1.5 Depth-Financial Markets -- A.1.6 Access-Financial Markets -- A.1.7 Efficiency-Financial Markets -- A.1.8 Stability-Financial Markets -- B.1 Economies and Their Market Discipline, Capital Regulation, and Supervision.
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Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations and Glossary -- Overview -- 1 Banking Regulation and Supervision: Conceptual Framework and Stylized Facts -- 2 Market Discipline -- 3 Bank Capital Regulation -- Statistical Appendixes -- A: Basic Data on Financial System Characteristics, 2015-17 -- B: Selected Indicators of Market Discipline, Capital Regulation, and Supervision -- Bibliography -- BOXES -- O.1 The World Bank's 2019 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey -- O.2 Main Messages of This Report -- O.3 Views on Regulation and Supervision by Practitioners: Financial Development Barometer -- O.4 Navigating This Report -- 1.1 Root Causes of the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis and Policy Lessons for Developing Countries -- 1.2 A Brief Historical Perspective on International Coordination and Harmonization in Banking Regulation and Supervision -- 1.3 Regulation and Supervision of Fintech Companies and Cybersecurity -- 1.4 Bank Resolution Cases: The Ukrainian Banking Crises -- 1.5 Use of Financial Technology in Banking Regulation and Supervision -- 1.6 Bank Regulation and Supervision 10 Years after the Global Financial Crisis -- 2.1 How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Stability? -- 2.2 Economic Costs of State Support during the Global Financial Crisis -- 2.3 Bank Resolution Cases: One Law with Different Applications by European Union Countries -- 2.4 Does Good Governance Lead to Financial Stability? -- 2.5 Shadow Banking in China -- 3.1 Types of Regulatory Capital -- 3.2 Capital as a Complement to Weak Supervisory Capacity -- 3.3 Is Bank Recapitalization an Effective Policy Tool for Banks in Distress? -- 3.4 Bank Capital: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis -- 3.5 Basel III -- 3.6 Adoption of Basel II and III in Developing Countries: Why and How? -- FIGURES.

BO.1.1 Geographic Coverage of Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, 2019 -- BO.3.1 Views on Postcrisis Regulations -- O.1 Deposit Insurance Systems Expanded since the Global Financial Crisis, by Country Income Group -- O.2 Better Bank Governance Is Associated with Higher Levels of Systemic Risk for Large Banks -- O.3 The Relationship between Bank Capital and Systemic Stability Is Stronger in Countries with Weaker Supervision -- O.4 Regulatory Capital-to-Asset Ratios over Time, 2004-18 -- O.5 Response of Bank Stock Returns to Lagged Bank Capital, 2006-08 -- O.6 Tier 1 Capital to Total Regulatory Capital, 2005-17 -- O.7 Share of Countries Following Each Basel Regime, by Country Income Group -- 1.1 Banks' Capital Requirements, 2008-16 -- 1.2 Leverage and Risk Weights of Large Banks versus Rest of National Banking Systems, 2005-15 -- 1.3 Quality and Definition of Regulatory Bank Capital -- 1.4 Definition of Regulatory Capital -- 1.5 Capital Regulations: Complementary Tools -- 1.6 Deposit Insurance Protection Scheme -- 1.7 Government Interventions to Rescue Banking Sectors -- 1.8 New Resolution Rules and Bail-In Debt Requirements -- 1.9 Banks' Disclosure of Risk Information -- 1.10 Information on Credit Ratings -- 1.11 Public Availability of Supervisory Reporting -- 1.12 Supervisory Powers -- 1.13 Supervisory Capacity -- 1.14 Basel Capital Framework Adoption and Basel II Implementation -- 1.15 Basel III Adoption and Implementation -- B1.6.1 Relation between Banking Crises and Bank Capital -- 2.1 Elements of Market Discipline -- 2.2 Increase in Deposit Insurance Coverage in Response to the Global Financial Crisis -- B2.2.1 Recapitalizations and Liquidity Support during Banking Crises, 2007-17 -- B2.2.2 Government Interventions in the European Union during Banking Crises, 2007-17 -- 2.3 Bank Sizes Worldwide and Regional Bank Concentrations.

2.4 New Rules for Systemically Important Banks -- 2.5 New Resolution Rules for Systemically Important Banks -- 2.6 Requirements Implemented for Resolving Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 2.7 Regulation of Systemic Risk in Systemically Important Financial Institutions -- 2.8 Governance Reforms in Banks -- B2.4.1 Corporate Governance of Banks and Leverage -- B2.5.1 Substitution across Allocative Instruments in China -- 2.9 Bank Riskiness, Impaired Loans, and Provisions before and after the Global Financial Crisis, by Country Income Group -- B3.5.1 A Comparison of the Capital Requirements for Basel II and III -- 3.1 Percentage of Countries Following Each Basel Regime, by Region -- B3.6.1 Percentage of Countries Adopting the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Approach, by Region -- 3.2 Percentage of Countries with Capital Buffers, by Region -- 3.3 Percentage of Countries with a Leverage Ratio Requirement, by Region and Basel Regime -- 3.4 Percentage of Countries Allowing Items as Part of Tier 1 Capital, 2010 and 2016 -- 3.5 Tier 1 Capital to Total Regulatory Capital, by Country Income Group -- 3.6 Total Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets, by Country Income Group -- 3.7 Total Regulatory Capital to Total Assets (Leverage Ratio), by Country Income Group -- 3.8 Risk-Weighted Assets to Total Assets, by Country Income Group -- TABLES -- BO.3.1 Views on Net Impact of Postcrisis Regulatory Changes -- B2.1.1 Stand-Alone and Systemic Risk before and after Global Financial Crisis -- B3.1.1 Examples of Regulatory Capital Instruments and Key Characteristics -- 3.1 Key Characteristics of Basel I and II -- A.1 Economies and Their Financial System Characteristics, 2015-17 -- A.1.1 Depth-Financial Institutions -- A.1.2 Access-Financial Institutions -- A.1.3 Efficiency-Financial Institutions -- A.1.4 Stability-Financial Institutions.

A.1.5 Depth-Financial Markets -- A.1.6 Access-Financial Markets -- A.1.7 Efficiency-Financial Markets -- A.1.8 Stability-Financial Markets -- B.1 Economies and Their Market Discipline, Capital Regulation, and Supervision.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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