Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission.

Front Cover -- Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- About the Editors -- List of Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- "To Know Where You're Going, Look at Where You've Been" -- Introduction -- Pharmaceuticals: A Case of FTC Investment and Consumption -- Provider Mergers: Clear Guidance from Litigated Cases -- No Need for Special Rules for Healthcare Markets -- ACKNOWLEDGMENT -- Notes -- References -- Actavis, Authorized Generics, and the Future of Antitrust Law -- Introduction -- Background -- Merits Analysis -- Hatch-Waxman Background -- Applying Merits Analysis to Hatch-Waxman -- Pre-Actavis Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Settlements -- Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis -- Understanding Actavis -- Bribing Generics to Stay Out of the Market -- Hypotheticals -- H1. The Litigants' Expectations about Litigation are Correct -- H2. The Parties Both Believe that the Brand Holds a "Strong" Patent -- H3. No Alignment in Expectations -- H4. Pessimistic Litigants Split the Patent Life with No Net Reverse Payment -- H5a. The Brand Prevailed in a Litigation Challenging Patent Validity but Settles a Second Challenge -- H5b. The Settlement Fails and the Parties Continue to Litigate -- H6. No Alignment in Expectations but Risk Aversion Leads to Settlements -- H7a. Efficiencies -- H7b. Efficiencies -- Some Conclusions Derived from the Hypotheticals -- Without Legal Limitations, There Will Be Anticompetitive Hatch-Waxman Settlements -- Actavis Abandons the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard for Determining Anticompetitive Effects -- If the Parties' Expectations Are Correct, Absent Risk Aversion, on Average, Consumers Are Often No Better Off with the Acta... -- Not Accounting for Risk Profiles May Harm Consumers -- Actavis Relies on Intent Evidence.

Actavis Relies on the Intent of the Brand, Not Necessarily the Generic -- If the Parties' Expectations Are Not Correct, the Actavis Solution May Make Consumers Worse Off than Merits Analysis -- Even in a Settlement without a Net Reverse Payment, One of the Parties May Intend to Achieve an Anticompetitive Effect -- Actavis Circumvents Other Elements of Conventional Antitrust Analysis -- A Red Flag Is Central to the Actavis Methodology -- There Is No Easy Means of Balancing Efficiencies against Anticompetitive Effects Using the Actavis Methodology -- Additional Unresolved Actavis Issues -- Antitrust Injury -- Damages -- The Slippery Slope of Mt. Actavis -- The No-AG Agreement -- Applying Actavis to Difficult IP/Antitrust Cases -- Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property -- Actavis beyond the IP/Antitrust Interface -- Where Are We Going? -- Notes -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Solving the Product-Hopping Conundrum through Safe Harbors and a No-Economic-Sense Test -- Introduction -- Product Hopping -- Forms of Product Hopping -- Hatch-Waxman Act -- State Drug Product Selection Laws -- Timing of Generic Entry -- A New Product-Hopping Framework -- Safe Harbors -- Outside Generic Window -- Reformulation after Generic Entry -- No-Economic-Sense Test -- Virtues of the No-Economic-Sense Test -- Support for the No-Economic-Sense Test -- Applications -- The Cases -- TriCor: Hard Switch, Nuanced Analysis, No Economic Sense -- Walgreens: Soft Switch, Simplistic Choice, No Economic Sense -- Suboxone: Hard/Soft Switch, Nuanced Analysis, No Economic Sense -- Doryx: Ignored Regulatory Regime and No Economic Sense -- Namenda: Robust Regulatory Analysis, Inadequate Coercion Focus, No Economic Sense -- No-Economic-Sense versus Hard Switch/Soft Switch -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References.

A Market All Its Own: Medicare Advantage as a Separate Product Market in the DOJ's Case against the Aetna-Humana Merger -- Introduction -- Background -- The Legal Framework for Horizontal Merger Challenges -- Reasonable Interchangeability: "Practical Indicia," Price Cross-elasticity of Demand, and More -- Original Medicare, Medicare Advantage, and Medicare Supplements -- The History of the Aetna-Humana Merger -- Market Definition: The Heart of the Aetna-Humana Case -- The Practical Indicia Approach to the Product Market -- The Econometric Analysis -- Reasonable Interchangeability and the Enduring Legacy of Brown Shoe -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- A History of the FTC's Bureau of Economics -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- Ch. I The Beginnings of the FTC and the Bureau of Economics -- Ch. II General Investigations, Economic Report Writing, &amp -- Research at the FTC -- The General Investigation Period: Growth (1915-40) and Decline (1940-60) -- Resurgence and Occasional Declines of Economic Reporting (1965-2012) -- Competition Studies -- Consumer Protection Studies -- Studies of Regulation and International Trade Restraints -- Bureau of Economics Working Papers (1977-2013) -- Bureau of Economics Conferences and Roundtables -- Reasons for the 1990s Decline in Economic Reporting -- Use of Compulsory Process for General Investigations and Report Writing -- Economic Support for Reports by the FTC Legal Organizations -- Ch. III The Rise and Fall of Systematic Data Collection and Reporting of Financial Statistics 1939-1984 -- Ch. IV The Role of Economists in Antitrust at the FTC -- Industry-wide Antitrust (Shared Monopoly and More) -- Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1967-2010 -- Merger Investigations -- Narrow Markets -- Empirical Analysis Takes Off -- The Litigation Onslaught of Summer 2007 -- The Pace Slows and Activity Shifts to Non-Merger Areas.

Vertical Restraints and Mergers -- Influence of Economists on Antitrust Cases -- The New Antitrust Transparency, 2001-2013 -- Expert Witness Work and Litigation Support in Antitrust -- Antitrust Case Generation and General Policy Analysis -- Antitrust Policy Discussions -- Ch. V The Role of Economists in Consumer Protection -- Economists and Trade Regulation Rules and Guides -- Individual Case Reviews -- Influence of Economists in Consumer Protection -- Expert Witness Work and Litigation Support in Consumer Protection -- Consumer Protection Policy Analysis and Case Generation -- Ch. VI The Role of Economists in Competition and Consumer Advocacy -- The Substance of the Advocacy Program -- Synergy between Research and Advocacy -- The Competition Advocacy Process and History -- Ch. VII International Technical Assistance and Policy Coordination: Advice to Other Countries (1990-2013) -- Ch. VIII Congressional Opprobrium and Other Criticism of the Agency and the Bureau -- Criticism of the Agency or the Bureau -- Threats to the Bureau from Outside: Congress and the White House -- Threats to the Bureau from within the Agency -- Ch. IX The Bureau of Economics' Independent Voice and Influence on the FTC -- Advice to Individual Commissioners -- Conclusion -- Ch. X A Graphical History of the Economic Division and the Bureau of Economics 1915-2013 -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- The Bureau of Economics Organization over Time -- The Bureau of Economics and Its Component Parts -- Changes in the Bureau's Staff Mix and Skill Mix 1915 to 2013 -- Francis Walker: The First FTC Chief Economist -- Bureau of Economics Chief Economists, recent FTC Chairmen, and U. S. Presidents -- Historical Data Table on BE and FTC 1915-2012 -- Labor Disputes and Pretrial Settlements: The French Case -- Introduction -- The French Labor Litigation Landscape and Its Implications.

French Lawyers -- The Judgment Ceiling -- Termination by Agreement -- Data -- Variables and Descriptive Statistics -- Econometric Analysis -- Summary and Discussion -- Notes -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Appendix -- Franchisees Facing Online Sales in a European Legal Context -- Introduction -- The European Legal Context -- A Website Is a Selling Method, Not a Store -- Authorized and Non authorized Online Sales -- Website Creation -- Website Management -- Franchisee Interviews: Methodology and Findings -- Methodology -- Franchisees' Attitudes Regarding Online Sales -- Online Sales as Inevitable -- Online Sales as a Disruption -- Online Sales as Complementary to In-Store Sales -- Online Sales as Competing with In-store Sales -- Creation of a Transactional Website by the Franchisor -- Nonopposition of the Franchisees to the Creation of a Transactional Website by the Franchisor -- A Regrettable Lack of Transparency within the Franchise Network -- Requests for Compensation -- Fears over Losing Business/Going Out of Business -- Creation of a Transactional Website by Franchisees -- The Franchisee's Opportunity to Create a Transactional Website -- The Ban Imposed on the Franchisee -- Conditional Authorization Granted -- The Franchisee's Obstacles to Create a Transactional Website -- Discussion -- Questions Related to Online Sales -- Sharing Online Sales -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Mandatory Upstream Inputs and Upward Pricing Pressure: Implications for Competition Policy -- Introduction -- Safeguards against Anticompetitive Conduct -- Exclusion -- Price Squeeze Safeguards -- Input/Retail Product Substitutability and Upward Pricing Pressure -- The Model -- Example -- Implications for Competition Policy -- Notes -- Acknowledgment -- References -- When Is the "Kennedy Correction" Appropriate in Estimating Overcharges?.

Introduction.

This volume of Research in Law and Economics contains articles that address important legal and economic developments in the areas of healthcare, intellectual property and labor settlements, competitive effects, cartel overcharges, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.