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Geological Repository Systems for Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuels and Radioactive Waste.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy SeriesPublisher: Cambridge : Elsevier Science & Technology, 2017Copyright date: ©2017Edition: 2nd edDescription: 1 online resource (804 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780081006528
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Geological Repository Systems for Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuels and Radioactive WasteDDC classification:
  • 621.4838
LOC classification:
  • TD898.2
Online resources:
Contents:
Front Cover -- Geological Repository Systems for Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuels and Radioactive Waste -- Related titles -- Geological Repository Systems for Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuels and Radioactive Waste -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of contributors -- Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the first edition -- 1 - Introduction to geological disposal of spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste -- 1 - Repository 101: multiple-barrier geological repository design and isolation strategies for safe disposal of radioactive ... -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Multiple-barrier geological repository for radioactive materials -- 1.3 Basic disposal strategies for radioactive materials -- 1.4 Containment of radioactive materials -- 1.4.1 Canister containment -- 1.4.2 Transport time -- 1.4.3 Additional issues -- 1.5 Constraints on concentration of radioactive materials -- 1.5.1 Waste-form dissolution and radioelement solubility -- 1.5.2 Additional waste-form considerations -- 1.5.2.1 Metastability -- 1.5.2.2 Shared solubility for radioelements -- 1.5.2.3 Low-solubility waste form -- 1.5.2.4 Inventory-limited release of radioelements -- 1.5.2.5 High-solubility radioelements -- 1.5.2.6 Trace-element behavior and coprecipitation -- 1.5.3 Temporally distributed containment failure -- 1.5.4 Spatially distributed containment failures -- 1.5.5 Far-field transport -- 1.5.6 Cumulative effect of constraints on concentration -- 1.6 Summary -- References -- 2 - Effects of very long-term interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and HLW on subsequent geological disposal -- 2.1 Background: commercial spent nuclear fuel storage systems -- 2.2 The need for long-term storage -- 2.3 Regulatory safety requirements -- 2.3.1 General safety functions -- 2.3.2 Aging management approach for licensing.
2.4 Potential long-term degradation of dry storage systems-technical issues -- 2.4.1 Data gap analyses -- Approaches to filling the data gaps -- 2.4.2 Systems, structures, and components-specific data gaps for long-term storage-some examples -- 2.4.2.1 Early dry storage field testing -- 2.4.2.2 Potential CSNF cladding embrittlement at higher burnup levels -- 2.4.2.3 Long-term degradation of welded stainless steel canisters -- 2.4.2.4 Addressing bolted lid data gaps -- 2.4.3 Plans to address the data gaps -- 2.4.3.1 Addressing the CISCC data gap for welded SS canister systems -- 2.4.3.2 Addressing the HBU CSNF cladding gap -- 2.4.3.3 Cask or canister replacement -- 2.5 Effects of long-term storage practices on subsequent transportation and disposal -- 2.6 Conclusion -- References -- 3 - Surface, subsurface, intermediate depth, and borehole disposal -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.1.1 Historical background to near-surface disposal -- 3.1.2 Current role of near-surface and borehole disposal in the overall context of radioactive waste management -- 3.1.3 Defining the "near-surface": limits to human intrusion -- 3.1.4 Outline of the sections -- 3.2 Safety requirements for near-surface disposal -- 3.2.1 IAEA safety principles and requirements -- 3.2.2 Safety of disposal facilities -- 3.2.2.1 Operational safety -- 3.2.2.2 Postclosure safety -- 3.2.2.3 Safety of mining and milling wastes -- 3.2.3 Significance of the institutional control period -- 3.3 Styles of near-surface disposal -- 3.3.1 General -- 3.3.2 Surface facilities-trenches and engineered vaults -- 3.3.3 Subsurface facilities-silos, caverns, and tunnels -- 3.3.3.1 Intermediate depth disposal -- 3.3.3.2 Deep disposal of LILW -- 3.3.4 Mining and milling wastes -- 3.3.5 Borehole facilities for large and small volume waste packages -- 3.3.6 The IAEA Borehole Disposal Concept for disused sealed sources.
3.4 Designing for safety -- 3.4.1 Stakeholder views -- 3.4.2 Waste acceptance criteria -- 3.4.3 Disposal environment -- 3.4.4 Engineered barriers -- 3.4.5 Natural barriers -- 3.4.6 Safety functions -- 3.5 Current issues and future trends -- 3.5.1 Remediation of historical near-surface disposal facilities -- 3.5.2 Intermediate depth disposal -- 3.5.3 Borehole disposal -- 3.6 Sources of further information -- References -- 4 - Deep borehole disposal of nuclear waste: US perspective -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Candidate wastes -- 4.3 Siting -- 4.4 Drilling -- 4.5 Emplacement -- 4.6 Seals -- 4.6.1 Bentonite -- 4.6.2 Cement -- 4.6.3 Rock welding -- 4.7 Safety analysis of borehole disposal of spent fuel -- 4.8 Safety analysis of borehole disposal of Cs/Sr -- 4.9 Preclosure safety -- 4.10 Deep borehole field test -- 4.11 Characterization borehole -- 4.12 Conclusions -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 5 - Relevance of underground rock laboratories for deep geological repository programs -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.1.1 Definition of URLs and their purposes -- 5.1.2 Chapter outline -- 5.2 Types of URLs and their roles in the staged development of repositories -- 5.2.1 Different types of URLs -- 5.2.2 Past and present URLs in the world -- 5.2.3 Evolution of URL investigation programs over time -- 5.3 Basic considerations when planning and designing a URL -- 5.3.1 General requirements for the implementation of a site-specific URL -- 5.3.2 Timing of URL development and the resources required -- 5.4 URLs in the service of public information and knowledge dissemination -- 5.4.1 Public outreach -- 5.4.2 URLs as training platforms and knowledge -- 5.5 Case studies of URL experiments -- 5.5.1 In situ characterization and testing of near-field and far-field processes -- 5.5.1.1 Colloid formation and migration -- 5.5.1.2 Long-term diffusion.
5.5.1.3 Large-scale monitoring -- 5.5.2 Large-scale demonstrations of engineered barrier performance -- 5.5.2.1 Full-scale engineered barrier system experiment -- 5.5.2.2 Full-scale emplacement -- 5.6 Concluding remarks and thoughts for the future -- References -- Further reading -- 2 Geological repository systems: characterization, site surveying and construction -- 6 - Salt repository systems: design development approach at the example of the Gorleben salt dome -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 A brief history of R&amp -- D for disposal in salt -- 6.3 Repository system in salt -- 6.3.1 Geology -- 6.3.2 Safety approach -- 6.3.3 Repository design -- 6.4 Repository closure -- 6.5 Retrievability -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- 7 - The Yucca Mountain license application -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Submittal of the Yucca Mountain license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and docketing for formal review -- 7.3 The content of the license application -- 7.3.1 General Information volume -- 7.3.1.1 General description -- 7.3.1.2 Waste forms to be disposed -- 7.3.1.3 Major surface facilities design features -- Initial handling facility -- Aging facility -- Wet handling facility -- Canister receipt and closure facilities -- 7.3.1.4 Major subsurface design features -- Underground excavations -- Waste packages -- Drip shields -- 7.3.1.5 Proposed schedules for construction, receipt, and emplacement of waste -- 7.3.2 Repository safety before permanent closure -- 7.3.2.1 Surface facility design -- 7.3.2.2 Subsurface facility design -- 7.3.2.3 Preclosure safety analysis -- 7.3.3 Repository safety after permanent closure -- 7.3.3.1 The multiple barrier repository system concept -- 7.3.3.2 Upper natural barrier -- 7.3.3.3 Engineered barrier system -- 7.3.3.4 Lower natural barrier -- 7.4 Research and development program to resolve safety questions.
7.5 Performance confirmation program -- 7.6 Management systems -- 7.7 The description of the safety of a repository at Yucca Mountain -- 7.7.1 Safety during the operations period -- 7.7.1.1 Features of surface operations facilities that are important to safe operations -- 7.7.1.2 Preclosure safety analysis methodology -- 7.7.1.3 Assessment of potential worker and public radiation health and safety -- 7.7.2 Safety of the repository after permanent closure -- 7.7.2.1 Features of the repository system considered in assessments of long-term performance -- 7.7.2.2 Results of the postclosure total system performance assessment -- 7.7.2.3 Compliance with the final Environmental Protection Agency standard and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation -- 7.8 Conclusions -- 8 - Assessing long-term stability of the geological environment -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.1.1 Recent geophysical and weather-related events and lessons learned for geological storage -- 8.2 Long-term volcano-tectonic stability issues -- 8.3 Geochemical stability issues -- 8.4 Potential climate change issues -- 8.5 Using geological, geophysical, and geochemical techniques for quantifying stability -- 8.5.1 Geological mapping -- 8.5.2 Measuring current crustal deformation using GPS -- 8.5.3 Active fault mapping and paleoseismology -- 8.5.4 Historical seismological record -- 8.5.5 Indicators or tectonic uplift or subsidence -- 8.5.6 Geophysical techniques for detecting crustal structure and volcanic intrusions -- 8.6 Modeling long-term stability -- 8.7 Future trends -- 8.8 Summary -- Sources of further information -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 9 - Far-field process analysis and radionuclide transport modeling for saturated media -- 9.1 Framework -- 9.1.1 Role of the geosphere in a repository system -- 9.1.2 Rock types considered as potential host formations.
9.1.3 Time scales of concern.
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Front Cover -- Geological Repository Systems for Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuels and Radioactive Waste -- Related titles -- Geological Repository Systems for Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuels and Radioactive Waste -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of contributors -- Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the first edition -- 1 - Introduction to geological disposal of spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste -- 1 - Repository 101: multiple-barrier geological repository design and isolation strategies for safe disposal of radioactive ... -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Multiple-barrier geological repository for radioactive materials -- 1.3 Basic disposal strategies for radioactive materials -- 1.4 Containment of radioactive materials -- 1.4.1 Canister containment -- 1.4.2 Transport time -- 1.4.3 Additional issues -- 1.5 Constraints on concentration of radioactive materials -- 1.5.1 Waste-form dissolution and radioelement solubility -- 1.5.2 Additional waste-form considerations -- 1.5.2.1 Metastability -- 1.5.2.2 Shared solubility for radioelements -- 1.5.2.3 Low-solubility waste form -- 1.5.2.4 Inventory-limited release of radioelements -- 1.5.2.5 High-solubility radioelements -- 1.5.2.6 Trace-element behavior and coprecipitation -- 1.5.3 Temporally distributed containment failure -- 1.5.4 Spatially distributed containment failures -- 1.5.5 Far-field transport -- 1.5.6 Cumulative effect of constraints on concentration -- 1.6 Summary -- References -- 2 - Effects of very long-term interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and HLW on subsequent geological disposal -- 2.1 Background: commercial spent nuclear fuel storage systems -- 2.2 The need for long-term storage -- 2.3 Regulatory safety requirements -- 2.3.1 General safety functions -- 2.3.2 Aging management approach for licensing.

2.4 Potential long-term degradation of dry storage systems-technical issues -- 2.4.1 Data gap analyses -- Approaches to filling the data gaps -- 2.4.2 Systems, structures, and components-specific data gaps for long-term storage-some examples -- 2.4.2.1 Early dry storage field testing -- 2.4.2.2 Potential CSNF cladding embrittlement at higher burnup levels -- 2.4.2.3 Long-term degradation of welded stainless steel canisters -- 2.4.2.4 Addressing bolted lid data gaps -- 2.4.3 Plans to address the data gaps -- 2.4.3.1 Addressing the CISCC data gap for welded SS canister systems -- 2.4.3.2 Addressing the HBU CSNF cladding gap -- 2.4.3.3 Cask or canister replacement -- 2.5 Effects of long-term storage practices on subsequent transportation and disposal -- 2.6 Conclusion -- References -- 3 - Surface, subsurface, intermediate depth, and borehole disposal -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.1.1 Historical background to near-surface disposal -- 3.1.2 Current role of near-surface and borehole disposal in the overall context of radioactive waste management -- 3.1.3 Defining the "near-surface": limits to human intrusion -- 3.1.4 Outline of the sections -- 3.2 Safety requirements for near-surface disposal -- 3.2.1 IAEA safety principles and requirements -- 3.2.2 Safety of disposal facilities -- 3.2.2.1 Operational safety -- 3.2.2.2 Postclosure safety -- 3.2.2.3 Safety of mining and milling wastes -- 3.2.3 Significance of the institutional control period -- 3.3 Styles of near-surface disposal -- 3.3.1 General -- 3.3.2 Surface facilities-trenches and engineered vaults -- 3.3.3 Subsurface facilities-silos, caverns, and tunnels -- 3.3.3.1 Intermediate depth disposal -- 3.3.3.2 Deep disposal of LILW -- 3.3.4 Mining and milling wastes -- 3.3.5 Borehole facilities for large and small volume waste packages -- 3.3.6 The IAEA Borehole Disposal Concept for disused sealed sources.

3.4 Designing for safety -- 3.4.1 Stakeholder views -- 3.4.2 Waste acceptance criteria -- 3.4.3 Disposal environment -- 3.4.4 Engineered barriers -- 3.4.5 Natural barriers -- 3.4.6 Safety functions -- 3.5 Current issues and future trends -- 3.5.1 Remediation of historical near-surface disposal facilities -- 3.5.2 Intermediate depth disposal -- 3.5.3 Borehole disposal -- 3.6 Sources of further information -- References -- 4 - Deep borehole disposal of nuclear waste: US perspective -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Candidate wastes -- 4.3 Siting -- 4.4 Drilling -- 4.5 Emplacement -- 4.6 Seals -- 4.6.1 Bentonite -- 4.6.2 Cement -- 4.6.3 Rock welding -- 4.7 Safety analysis of borehole disposal of spent fuel -- 4.8 Safety analysis of borehole disposal of Cs/Sr -- 4.9 Preclosure safety -- 4.10 Deep borehole field test -- 4.11 Characterization borehole -- 4.12 Conclusions -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 5 - Relevance of underground rock laboratories for deep geological repository programs -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.1.1 Definition of URLs and their purposes -- 5.1.2 Chapter outline -- 5.2 Types of URLs and their roles in the staged development of repositories -- 5.2.1 Different types of URLs -- 5.2.2 Past and present URLs in the world -- 5.2.3 Evolution of URL investigation programs over time -- 5.3 Basic considerations when planning and designing a URL -- 5.3.1 General requirements for the implementation of a site-specific URL -- 5.3.2 Timing of URL development and the resources required -- 5.4 URLs in the service of public information and knowledge dissemination -- 5.4.1 Public outreach -- 5.4.2 URLs as training platforms and knowledge -- 5.5 Case studies of URL experiments -- 5.5.1 In situ characterization and testing of near-field and far-field processes -- 5.5.1.1 Colloid formation and migration -- 5.5.1.2 Long-term diffusion.

5.5.1.3 Large-scale monitoring -- 5.5.2 Large-scale demonstrations of engineered barrier performance -- 5.5.2.1 Full-scale engineered barrier system experiment -- 5.5.2.2 Full-scale emplacement -- 5.6 Concluding remarks and thoughts for the future -- References -- Further reading -- 2 Geological repository systems: characterization, site surveying and construction -- 6 - Salt repository systems: design development approach at the example of the Gorleben salt dome -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 A brief history of R&amp -- D for disposal in salt -- 6.3 Repository system in salt -- 6.3.1 Geology -- 6.3.2 Safety approach -- 6.3.3 Repository design -- 6.4 Repository closure -- 6.5 Retrievability -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- 7 - The Yucca Mountain license application -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Submittal of the Yucca Mountain license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and docketing for formal review -- 7.3 The content of the license application -- 7.3.1 General Information volume -- 7.3.1.1 General description -- 7.3.1.2 Waste forms to be disposed -- 7.3.1.3 Major surface facilities design features -- Initial handling facility -- Aging facility -- Wet handling facility -- Canister receipt and closure facilities -- 7.3.1.4 Major subsurface design features -- Underground excavations -- Waste packages -- Drip shields -- 7.3.1.5 Proposed schedules for construction, receipt, and emplacement of waste -- 7.3.2 Repository safety before permanent closure -- 7.3.2.1 Surface facility design -- 7.3.2.2 Subsurface facility design -- 7.3.2.3 Preclosure safety analysis -- 7.3.3 Repository safety after permanent closure -- 7.3.3.1 The multiple barrier repository system concept -- 7.3.3.2 Upper natural barrier -- 7.3.3.3 Engineered barrier system -- 7.3.3.4 Lower natural barrier -- 7.4 Research and development program to resolve safety questions.

7.5 Performance confirmation program -- 7.6 Management systems -- 7.7 The description of the safety of a repository at Yucca Mountain -- 7.7.1 Safety during the operations period -- 7.7.1.1 Features of surface operations facilities that are important to safe operations -- 7.7.1.2 Preclosure safety analysis methodology -- 7.7.1.3 Assessment of potential worker and public radiation health and safety -- 7.7.2 Safety of the repository after permanent closure -- 7.7.2.1 Features of the repository system considered in assessments of long-term performance -- 7.7.2.2 Results of the postclosure total system performance assessment -- 7.7.2.3 Compliance with the final Environmental Protection Agency standard and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation -- 7.8 Conclusions -- 8 - Assessing long-term stability of the geological environment -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.1.1 Recent geophysical and weather-related events and lessons learned for geological storage -- 8.2 Long-term volcano-tectonic stability issues -- 8.3 Geochemical stability issues -- 8.4 Potential climate change issues -- 8.5 Using geological, geophysical, and geochemical techniques for quantifying stability -- 8.5.1 Geological mapping -- 8.5.2 Measuring current crustal deformation using GPS -- 8.5.3 Active fault mapping and paleoseismology -- 8.5.4 Historical seismological record -- 8.5.5 Indicators or tectonic uplift or subsidence -- 8.5.6 Geophysical techniques for detecting crustal structure and volcanic intrusions -- 8.6 Modeling long-term stability -- 8.7 Future trends -- 8.8 Summary -- Sources of further information -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 9 - Far-field process analysis and radionuclide transport modeling for saturated media -- 9.1 Framework -- 9.1.1 Role of the geosphere in a repository system -- 9.1.2 Rock types considered as potential host formations.

9.1.3 Time scales of concern.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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