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The Ethics of Discernment : Lonergan's Foundations for Ethics.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Lonergan StudiesPublisher: Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 2016Copyright date: ©2016Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (526 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781442630734
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: The Ethics of DiscernmentDDC classification:
  • 170/.4
LOC classification:
  • BJ404 L663.B97 2016eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- PART I: PRELIMINARIES -- 1 Discernment and Self-Appropriation -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Notion of Discernment -- 1.3 Aristotle of Stagira -- 1.4 Paul of Tarsus -- 1.5 Ignatius of Loyola -- 1.6 Bernard Lonergan -- 1.7 Self-Appropriation as Discernment -- 1.8 Conclusion -- 2 Objectivity and Factual Knowing: Lonergan's Three Questions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Lonergan's Three Questions -- 2.3 Inquiries, Questions, and Wonder -- 2.4 Cognitional Structure: What Am I Doing When I Am Knowing? -- 2.4.1 The Patterned Stream of Experiencing, Remembering, Imagining -- 2.4.2 Questions for Intelligence and Acts of Understanding -- 2.4.3 Questions for Reflection, Judging, and Reflective Understanding -- 2.4.4 Judging the Correctness of Insights -- 2.4.5 Summary -- 2.5 Objectivity: Why Is Doing That Knowing? -- 2.5.1 Lonergan's Answer -- 2.5.2 Contending Notions of Objectivity and the "Epistemological Theorem" -- 2.5.3 Is Human Questioning Unrestricted? -- 2.5.4 Ongoing Criticism -- 2.5.5 Biases: Mere Subjectivity vs. Authentic Subjectivity -- 2.6 Reality: What Do I Know When I Do That? -- 2.6.1 The Simple Answer -- 2.6.2 Contending Notions of Reality -- 2.6.3 Reality as Intelligible -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 Self-Appropriation, Part I: Self-Affirmation of Cognitional Structure -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Self-Appropriation and Self-Affirmation -- 3.3 Self-Affirmation as Conditioned -- 3.4 Self-Affirmation of the Knower as Hermeneutical -- 3.4.1 Consciousness as Experience -- 3.4.2 Cognitional Structure Applied to Cognitional Structure -- 3.4.3 Mediated Givenness -- 3.4.4 Correctly Understanding Consciousness-as-Experience as Hermeneutical -- 3.5 A Decisive Act -- PART II: WHAT ARE WE DOING WHEN WE ARE BEING ETHICAL? -- 4 The Structure of Ethical Intentionality: Three More Questions -- 4.1 Introduction.
4.2 Structure of Ethical Intentionality: What Am I Doing When I Am Being Ethical? -- 4.3 Basic Ethical Questions -- 4.4 What Is the Situation? -- 4.5 Questions and Insights of Practical Import -- 4.6 Questions for Ethical Reflection and Judgment -- 4.6.1 Feelings and Ethical Reflection -- 4.6.2 Judgments of Ethical Value -- 4.7 Questions for Choosing, Deciding, Acting -- 4.8 Value Knowledge and Belief -- 4.9 Summary -- 5 Kinds of Feelings -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 A Basic Division of Feelings -- 5.3 Somatic Feelings as Grounded in Neural Processes -- 5.4 Somatic Feelings as Intentional -- 5.5 Somatic Feelings and Patterns of Experiencing -- 5.6 Somatic Feelings in Ethical Life -- 5.7 A Further Division of Feelings: Desires/Aversions, Affects, and Moods -- 6 Feelings as Intentional Responses and Horizons of Feelings -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Rich Field of Feelings as Intentional Responses -- 6.3 Intentional Responses to What? -- 6.4 The Multiple Intentionality of Insights -- 6.5 The Multiple Intentionality of Affect-Feelings -- 6.5.1 Value: The Proper Noematic Object of Affect-Feeling Responses -- 6.5.2 Movers of Affective Responses -- 6.5.3 Expressions as "Terminal Objects" of Affective Feeling Responses -- 6.5.4 True Values and the Quasi-Infallibility of Affects and Values -- 6.6 Desires, Aversions, and Moods as Intentional Responses -- 6.6.1 Desires and Aversions -- 6.6.2 Moods as Intentional Responses -- 6.6.3 Questioning as Intentional Response -- 6.7 Concrete Illustrations -- 6.8 Horizons of Feelings as Intentional Responses -- 6.9 Summary -- 7 Feelings and Value Reflection -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Habitual Valuing and Questions of Value -- 7.3 Value Reflection and the Horizon of Feelings -- 7.3.1 A Question of Vital Value -- 7.3.2 Questions of Social and Artistic Value -- 7.3.3 Feelings and Judgments of Value.
7.4 Reflection about Questions of Ethical Value -- 7.4.1 The Ethics of Ordinary Life in Northanger Abbey -- 7.4.2. Ethical Reflection in Jury Deliberation -- 7.4.3 Summary -- 7.5 The Double Intentionality of Ethical Reflection, Judgment, and Decision -- 7.6 Habitual Deciding and Acting within Horizons of Feelings -- 7.7 An Alternate Interpretation -- 7.8 Summary -- PART III: WHY IS DOING THAT BEING ETHICAL? -- 8 Horizons of Feelings, Conversion, and Objectivity -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Tensions in Feeling Horizons and Value Objectivity -- 8.2.1 The Transcendental Notion of Value -- 8.2.2 Is the Notion of Value Unrestricted? -- 8.2.3 Unrestricted Being-in-Love -- 8.3 Conversions and Horizons of Feelings -- 8.3.1 Intellectual Conversion -- 8.3.2 Religious Conversion -- 8.3.3 Moral Conversion -- 8.3.4 Moral Conversion and the Scale of Values -- 8.3.5 Illustrations of Moral Conversion -- 8.3.6. Psychic Conversion -- 8.4 Conversion and Objectivity -- 9 Judgments of Comparative Value and the Scale of Value Preference -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Judgments of Comparative Value and Scales of Preference -- 9.2.1 Reflections on Value Comparison in General -- 9.2.2 Some Illustrations of Reflecting about Value Comparisons -- 9.2.3 Time and Comparative Values -- 9.2.4 Felt Scales and Concrete Deliberations -- 9.2.5 Ethical Reflection and Feeling Preferences in Middlemarch -- 9.3 Scheler on Intimations of the Objective Scale -- 9.4 Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand Compared -- 9.4.1 Scheler's Account of the Scale -- 9.4.2 Von Hildebrand's Account of the Scale -- 9.4.3 Similarities and Differences -- 9.5 Elaboration of Lonergan's Scale of Values -- 9.6 Concrete Instances in the Light of Lonergan's Scale -- 9.7 Reason and the Priority of Feelings of Preference -- 9.8 Comparative Value Judgments about Questions to be Pursued -- 9.9 Moral Conversion Revisited.
9.10 Objectivity and Lonergan's Formulation of the Scale -- 10 Self-Appropriation, Part II: Why Is Doing That Being Ethical? -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Notion of the Ethical -- 10.2.1 Aristotle's Notion of the Ethical -- 10.2.2 Eight Commonly Held Ideas about the Ethical -- 10.2.3 Summary -- 10.3 Being Ethical and Choosing the Value of the Chooser: Self-Appropriation, Part II -- 10.3.1 Existential Discovery as Breakthrough to Self-Appropriation -- 10.3.2 Self-Appropriation: Factual Knowledge of the Structure of Ethical Intentionality -- 10.3.3 Self-Appropriation: Valuing, Choosing, and Enacting Oneself -- 10.4 Self-Appropriation and Discernment -- PART IV: WHAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY DOING THAT? -- 11 The Human Good Described -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Parameters of the Human Good -- 11.3 The Human Good as Personal: The Good of an Authentic Human Life -- 11.4 The Human Good as Social -- 11.5 The Human Good as Historical: The Corporate Good of Human History -- 11.6 Summary -- 11.7 An Illustration: Building a Water Well in Malaya -- 12 The Human Good: Explanatory Foundations -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 The Structure of the Human Good as Heuristic -- 12.3 Invariance of the Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being -- 12.3.1 The Isomorphism between Human Cognition and Potency, Form, and Act -- 12.3.2 The Invariance of the Structure of Potency, Form, and Act -- 12.3.3 Further Dimensions of the Integral Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being -- 12.4 The Structure of the Human Good as Invariant -- 12.4.1 Heuristic Definition of the Human Good -- 12.4.2 Derivation of the Heuristic Structure of the Human Good -- 12.4.3 Terminal Value, Originating Value, Orientation, Conversion, Liberty -- 12.4.4 Operation, Skill, Development, Plasticity, Perfectibility -- 12.4.5 Operation, Cooperation, Good of Order, Task, Role, Institution, Particular Good.
12.4.6 Personal Relations -- 12.4.7 Needs and Particular Goods -- 12.5 Summary: The Heuristics and the Invariance of the Human Good -- 13 The Notion and the Ontology of the Good -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Goodness of the Natural Universe -- 13.2.1 The Goodness of the Natural Order as a Whole -- 13.2.2 The Kinds of Goodness within the Natural Whole -- 13.3 Further Considerations -- 13.3.1 Is Lonergan's Argument Anthropomorphic? -- 13.3.2 Feeling-Response to the Universe of Proportionate Being -- 13.3.3 The Goodness of Proportionate Being and Natural Law Ethics -- 13.3.4 The Inadequacy of the Insight Argument -- 13.4 The Transcendent Good -- 13.4.1 Transcendent Being as Ultimate Condition of Our Value Choices -- 13.4.2 Transcendent Being as Understanding and Loving -- 13.5 The Goodness of Being and the Problem of Evil -- 13.5.1 The Unintelligibility and Non-Value of Evil -- 13.5.2. The Ethics of Bringing Good Out of Evil -- 13.6 The Notion of the Good and Conceptions of the Good -- 14 Explanatory Genera and the Objective Scale of Values: A Preliminary Grounding -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Higher Viewpoints -- 14.3 Higher Viewpoints, Natural Sciences, and Explanatory Genera -- 14.4 A Hierarchical Scale of Natural Values -- 14.5 Higher Explanatory Genera and the Objective Scale of Value Preference -- 14.6 Value Preference within a Given Level, and Explanatory Species -- 14.7 Alternate Approaches -- PART V: METHOD IN ETHICS -- 15 Method in Ethics I: Preliminaries -- 15.1 Ethical Intentionality as Methodical -- 15.2 The Method of Ethics in Insight -- 15.3 Personal Decisions as Situated and Methodical -- 15.4 Situated in a Climate of Conflict -- 15.5 Method and Conflict -- 15.6 The Eight Functional Specialties of Ethical Method -- 16 Method in Ethics II: Dialectic and Foundations -- 16.1 Introduction.
16.2 Critically Engaging Our Heritage: Research, Interpretation, and History.
Summary: In The Ethics of Discernment, Patrick H. Byrne presents an approach to ethics that builds upon the cognitional theory and the philosophical method of self-appropriation that Bernard Lonergan introduced in his book Insight, as well as upon Lonergan's later writing on ethics and values.
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Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- PART I: PRELIMINARIES -- 1 Discernment and Self-Appropriation -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Notion of Discernment -- 1.3 Aristotle of Stagira -- 1.4 Paul of Tarsus -- 1.5 Ignatius of Loyola -- 1.6 Bernard Lonergan -- 1.7 Self-Appropriation as Discernment -- 1.8 Conclusion -- 2 Objectivity and Factual Knowing: Lonergan's Three Questions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Lonergan's Three Questions -- 2.3 Inquiries, Questions, and Wonder -- 2.4 Cognitional Structure: What Am I Doing When I Am Knowing? -- 2.4.1 The Patterned Stream of Experiencing, Remembering, Imagining -- 2.4.2 Questions for Intelligence and Acts of Understanding -- 2.4.3 Questions for Reflection, Judging, and Reflective Understanding -- 2.4.4 Judging the Correctness of Insights -- 2.4.5 Summary -- 2.5 Objectivity: Why Is Doing That Knowing? -- 2.5.1 Lonergan's Answer -- 2.5.2 Contending Notions of Objectivity and the "Epistemological Theorem" -- 2.5.3 Is Human Questioning Unrestricted? -- 2.5.4 Ongoing Criticism -- 2.5.5 Biases: Mere Subjectivity vs. Authentic Subjectivity -- 2.6 Reality: What Do I Know When I Do That? -- 2.6.1 The Simple Answer -- 2.6.2 Contending Notions of Reality -- 2.6.3 Reality as Intelligible -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 Self-Appropriation, Part I: Self-Affirmation of Cognitional Structure -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Self-Appropriation and Self-Affirmation -- 3.3 Self-Affirmation as Conditioned -- 3.4 Self-Affirmation of the Knower as Hermeneutical -- 3.4.1 Consciousness as Experience -- 3.4.2 Cognitional Structure Applied to Cognitional Structure -- 3.4.3 Mediated Givenness -- 3.4.4 Correctly Understanding Consciousness-as-Experience as Hermeneutical -- 3.5 A Decisive Act -- PART II: WHAT ARE WE DOING WHEN WE ARE BEING ETHICAL? -- 4 The Structure of Ethical Intentionality: Three More Questions -- 4.1 Introduction.

4.2 Structure of Ethical Intentionality: What Am I Doing When I Am Being Ethical? -- 4.3 Basic Ethical Questions -- 4.4 What Is the Situation? -- 4.5 Questions and Insights of Practical Import -- 4.6 Questions for Ethical Reflection and Judgment -- 4.6.1 Feelings and Ethical Reflection -- 4.6.2 Judgments of Ethical Value -- 4.7 Questions for Choosing, Deciding, Acting -- 4.8 Value Knowledge and Belief -- 4.9 Summary -- 5 Kinds of Feelings -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 A Basic Division of Feelings -- 5.3 Somatic Feelings as Grounded in Neural Processes -- 5.4 Somatic Feelings as Intentional -- 5.5 Somatic Feelings and Patterns of Experiencing -- 5.6 Somatic Feelings in Ethical Life -- 5.7 A Further Division of Feelings: Desires/Aversions, Affects, and Moods -- 6 Feelings as Intentional Responses and Horizons of Feelings -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Rich Field of Feelings as Intentional Responses -- 6.3 Intentional Responses to What? -- 6.4 The Multiple Intentionality of Insights -- 6.5 The Multiple Intentionality of Affect-Feelings -- 6.5.1 Value: The Proper Noematic Object of Affect-Feeling Responses -- 6.5.2 Movers of Affective Responses -- 6.5.3 Expressions as "Terminal Objects" of Affective Feeling Responses -- 6.5.4 True Values and the Quasi-Infallibility of Affects and Values -- 6.6 Desires, Aversions, and Moods as Intentional Responses -- 6.6.1 Desires and Aversions -- 6.6.2 Moods as Intentional Responses -- 6.6.3 Questioning as Intentional Response -- 6.7 Concrete Illustrations -- 6.8 Horizons of Feelings as Intentional Responses -- 6.9 Summary -- 7 Feelings and Value Reflection -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Habitual Valuing and Questions of Value -- 7.3 Value Reflection and the Horizon of Feelings -- 7.3.1 A Question of Vital Value -- 7.3.2 Questions of Social and Artistic Value -- 7.3.3 Feelings and Judgments of Value.

7.4 Reflection about Questions of Ethical Value -- 7.4.1 The Ethics of Ordinary Life in Northanger Abbey -- 7.4.2. Ethical Reflection in Jury Deliberation -- 7.4.3 Summary -- 7.5 The Double Intentionality of Ethical Reflection, Judgment, and Decision -- 7.6 Habitual Deciding and Acting within Horizons of Feelings -- 7.7 An Alternate Interpretation -- 7.8 Summary -- PART III: WHY IS DOING THAT BEING ETHICAL? -- 8 Horizons of Feelings, Conversion, and Objectivity -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Tensions in Feeling Horizons and Value Objectivity -- 8.2.1 The Transcendental Notion of Value -- 8.2.2 Is the Notion of Value Unrestricted? -- 8.2.3 Unrestricted Being-in-Love -- 8.3 Conversions and Horizons of Feelings -- 8.3.1 Intellectual Conversion -- 8.3.2 Religious Conversion -- 8.3.3 Moral Conversion -- 8.3.4 Moral Conversion and the Scale of Values -- 8.3.5 Illustrations of Moral Conversion -- 8.3.6. Psychic Conversion -- 8.4 Conversion and Objectivity -- 9 Judgments of Comparative Value and the Scale of Value Preference -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Judgments of Comparative Value and Scales of Preference -- 9.2.1 Reflections on Value Comparison in General -- 9.2.2 Some Illustrations of Reflecting about Value Comparisons -- 9.2.3 Time and Comparative Values -- 9.2.4 Felt Scales and Concrete Deliberations -- 9.2.5 Ethical Reflection and Feeling Preferences in Middlemarch -- 9.3 Scheler on Intimations of the Objective Scale -- 9.4 Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand Compared -- 9.4.1 Scheler's Account of the Scale -- 9.4.2 Von Hildebrand's Account of the Scale -- 9.4.3 Similarities and Differences -- 9.5 Elaboration of Lonergan's Scale of Values -- 9.6 Concrete Instances in the Light of Lonergan's Scale -- 9.7 Reason and the Priority of Feelings of Preference -- 9.8 Comparative Value Judgments about Questions to be Pursued -- 9.9 Moral Conversion Revisited.

9.10 Objectivity and Lonergan's Formulation of the Scale -- 10 Self-Appropriation, Part II: Why Is Doing That Being Ethical? -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Notion of the Ethical -- 10.2.1 Aristotle's Notion of the Ethical -- 10.2.2 Eight Commonly Held Ideas about the Ethical -- 10.2.3 Summary -- 10.3 Being Ethical and Choosing the Value of the Chooser: Self-Appropriation, Part II -- 10.3.1 Existential Discovery as Breakthrough to Self-Appropriation -- 10.3.2 Self-Appropriation: Factual Knowledge of the Structure of Ethical Intentionality -- 10.3.3 Self-Appropriation: Valuing, Choosing, and Enacting Oneself -- 10.4 Self-Appropriation and Discernment -- PART IV: WHAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY DOING THAT? -- 11 The Human Good Described -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Parameters of the Human Good -- 11.3 The Human Good as Personal: The Good of an Authentic Human Life -- 11.4 The Human Good as Social -- 11.5 The Human Good as Historical: The Corporate Good of Human History -- 11.6 Summary -- 11.7 An Illustration: Building a Water Well in Malaya -- 12 The Human Good: Explanatory Foundations -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 The Structure of the Human Good as Heuristic -- 12.3 Invariance of the Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being -- 12.3.1 The Isomorphism between Human Cognition and Potency, Form, and Act -- 12.3.2 The Invariance of the Structure of Potency, Form, and Act -- 12.3.3 Further Dimensions of the Integral Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being -- 12.4 The Structure of the Human Good as Invariant -- 12.4.1 Heuristic Definition of the Human Good -- 12.4.2 Derivation of the Heuristic Structure of the Human Good -- 12.4.3 Terminal Value, Originating Value, Orientation, Conversion, Liberty -- 12.4.4 Operation, Skill, Development, Plasticity, Perfectibility -- 12.4.5 Operation, Cooperation, Good of Order, Task, Role, Institution, Particular Good.

12.4.6 Personal Relations -- 12.4.7 Needs and Particular Goods -- 12.5 Summary: The Heuristics and the Invariance of the Human Good -- 13 The Notion and the Ontology of the Good -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Goodness of the Natural Universe -- 13.2.1 The Goodness of the Natural Order as a Whole -- 13.2.2 The Kinds of Goodness within the Natural Whole -- 13.3 Further Considerations -- 13.3.1 Is Lonergan's Argument Anthropomorphic? -- 13.3.2 Feeling-Response to the Universe of Proportionate Being -- 13.3.3 The Goodness of Proportionate Being and Natural Law Ethics -- 13.3.4 The Inadequacy of the Insight Argument -- 13.4 The Transcendent Good -- 13.4.1 Transcendent Being as Ultimate Condition of Our Value Choices -- 13.4.2 Transcendent Being as Understanding and Loving -- 13.5 The Goodness of Being and the Problem of Evil -- 13.5.1 The Unintelligibility and Non-Value of Evil -- 13.5.2. The Ethics of Bringing Good Out of Evil -- 13.6 The Notion of the Good and Conceptions of the Good -- 14 Explanatory Genera and the Objective Scale of Values: A Preliminary Grounding -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Higher Viewpoints -- 14.3 Higher Viewpoints, Natural Sciences, and Explanatory Genera -- 14.4 A Hierarchical Scale of Natural Values -- 14.5 Higher Explanatory Genera and the Objective Scale of Value Preference -- 14.6 Value Preference within a Given Level, and Explanatory Species -- 14.7 Alternate Approaches -- PART V: METHOD IN ETHICS -- 15 Method in Ethics I: Preliminaries -- 15.1 Ethical Intentionality as Methodical -- 15.2 The Method of Ethics in Insight -- 15.3 Personal Decisions as Situated and Methodical -- 15.4 Situated in a Climate of Conflict -- 15.5 Method and Conflict -- 15.6 The Eight Functional Specialties of Ethical Method -- 16 Method in Ethics II: Dialectic and Foundations -- 16.1 Introduction.

16.2 Critically Engaging Our Heritage: Research, Interpretation, and History.

In The Ethics of Discernment, Patrick H. Byrne presents an approach to ethics that builds upon the cognitional theory and the philosophical method of self-appropriation that Bernard Lonergan introduced in his book Insight, as well as upon Lonergan's later writing on ethics and values.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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