Towards a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception : How We Relate to the World.

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I. Conceptualism -- 1. Introducing Conceptualism -- 1.1 Mind and World - the Beginnings of Conceptualism as We Know It -- 1.2 Details of Conceptual Capacities in Perception -- 1.3 Conceptualist Disjunctivism and the Capacity Approach to Perception -- 1.4 Two Developments of Conceptualism: Conceptual Content as Perceptual Demonstrative Content and as Enacted Content -- 2. Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments against Conceptualism -- 2.1 A Close Reading Analysis of a Standard Non-Conceptualist Argument: the Argument from Animal Perception -- 2.2 Excursus: Remarks about Concepts, Conceptual Capacities, and Rationality -- 2.3 Reviewing the Argument from Hyper-Intellectualization -- 2.4 Reviewing the Argument from Concept Acquisition -- 2.5 Reviewing the Argument from Memory Experience -- 2.6 A Close Reading Analysis of the Argument from Fineness of Grain -- 2.7 A Close Reading Analysis of the Argument from Fallibility -- 2.8 First Conclusions: Conceptualism Survives the Non-Conceptualist Arguments, But Where Does It Stand? -- 3. Examining McDowell's Revised Conceptualism -- 3.1 Avoiding the Myth of the Given, Travis's Relationism and the Role of Intuitional Content -- 3.2 Does "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" Provide a Coherent Conceptualist Theory? -- 3.3 Is Conceptualism Just a Theory that Avoids the Myth of the Given? -- Part II. Relationism -- 4. Relationism: Perception as Conscious Acquaintance -- 4.1 What is Relationism? -- 4.2 The Object View's Rejection of Representationalism -- 5. Relationism as Anti-Representationalism -- 5.1 Travis's Anti-Representationalism: the Bigger Picture -- 5.2 Travis's Arguments against Representationalism: the Problem of Selection, the Problem of Incoherent Content and the Problem of Attaining Generality -- 5.3 Non-Conceptualist Representationalism as an Incoherent Theory.

5.4 Travis's Arguments against McDowell's Conceptualism: Perceptual Experience Does Not Have Conceptual Content -- 5.5 Perception as Mere Visual Awareness: Travis's Conception of Perceptual Experience -- 6. Why McDowell's Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis's Anti-Representationalist Criticism -- Part III. Relational Conceptualism -- 7. Relational Conceptualism: a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception -- 7.1 Preliminaries -- 7.2 The Nature of Perceptual Experience on the Relational Conceptualist Account -- 7.3 Developing Relational Conceptualism -- 8. Possible Objections against Relational Conceptualism -- Part IV. Relational Conceptualism and Empirical Science -- 9. Broadening the Scope of Relational Conceptualism -- 9.1 Objections against Conceptualism from Empirical Science -- 9.2 Support for Conceptualism from Empirical Science -- 9.3 Roots and Routes for Relational Conceptualism to Trace -- References -- Author Index -- Subject Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.