Rational Causation.
Marcus, Eric.
Rational Causation. - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (279 pages)
Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Rational Explanation of Belief -- 1. q, so p -- 2. S Believes That p Because q -- 3. S Believes That p Because S Believes That q -- 4. Rational Abilities -- 5. Anti- Psychologism about the Rational Explanation of Belief -- 2. Rational Explanation of Action -- 1. Acting- for- a-Reason as Practical Thought -- 2. Objections -- 3. Instrumental Teleological Explanation -- 4. Anti - Psychologism about the Rational Explanation of Action -- 3. (Non- Human) Animals and Their Reasons -- 1. Animals Are Responsive to Reasons -- 2. Animal Responsiveness to Reasons Is Epistemic -- 3. Objects of Knowledge versus Objects of Belief -- 4. Evidence Supporting Animal Belief Better Supports Animal Knowledge -- 5. An Argument against Animal Belief -- 6. Animal Agency -- 7. Explaining Belief versus Explaining Knowledge -- 8. Aside on Why Human (But Not Animal) PerceptionIs Conceptual -- 4. Rational Explanation and Rational Causation -- 1. Causation and Rational Explanation -- 2. Rational Causation -- 5. Events and States -- 1. Objects, Events, and Sortals -- 2. States and Events- in- Progress -- 6. Physicalism -- 1. Physicalist Arguments Foiled -- 2. Physicalist Positions Refuted -- 3. Supervenience -- Acknowledgments -- Index.
Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to explain rationality by viewing the mind as a kind of machine--the only alternative, it has seemed, to a ghostly supernatural explanation. Marcus rejects this choice as false and defends a third way--via rational causation, which draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings.
9780674065338
Act (Philosophy).
Agent (Philosophy).
Causation.
Electronic books.
BD530
122
Rational Causation. - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (279 pages)
Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Rational Explanation of Belief -- 1. q, so p -- 2. S Believes That p Because q -- 3. S Believes That p Because S Believes That q -- 4. Rational Abilities -- 5. Anti- Psychologism about the Rational Explanation of Belief -- 2. Rational Explanation of Action -- 1. Acting- for- a-Reason as Practical Thought -- 2. Objections -- 3. Instrumental Teleological Explanation -- 4. Anti - Psychologism about the Rational Explanation of Action -- 3. (Non- Human) Animals and Their Reasons -- 1. Animals Are Responsive to Reasons -- 2. Animal Responsiveness to Reasons Is Epistemic -- 3. Objects of Knowledge versus Objects of Belief -- 4. Evidence Supporting Animal Belief Better Supports Animal Knowledge -- 5. An Argument against Animal Belief -- 6. Animal Agency -- 7. Explaining Belief versus Explaining Knowledge -- 8. Aside on Why Human (But Not Animal) PerceptionIs Conceptual -- 4. Rational Explanation and Rational Causation -- 1. Causation and Rational Explanation -- 2. Rational Causation -- 5. Events and States -- 1. Objects, Events, and Sortals -- 2. States and Events- in- Progress -- 6. Physicalism -- 1. Physicalist Arguments Foiled -- 2. Physicalist Positions Refuted -- 3. Supervenience -- Acknowledgments -- Index.
Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to explain rationality by viewing the mind as a kind of machine--the only alternative, it has seemed, to a ghostly supernatural explanation. Marcus rejects this choice as false and defends a third way--via rational causation, which draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings.
9780674065338
Act (Philosophy).
Agent (Philosophy).
Causation.
Electronic books.
BD530
122