Defeasibility in Philosophy : Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law.
Blöser, Claudia.
Defeasibility in Philosophy : Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law. - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (258 pages) - Grazer Philosophische Studien ; v.87 . - Grazer Philosophische Studien .
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Knowledge, Ascriptivism and Defeasible Concepts -- Knowledge, Defeasibility, and the Gettier Problem -- The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overriding Case -- Entitlement and Public Accessibility of Epistemic Status -- Strawsonian Epistemology. What Epistemologists Can Learn from "Freedom and Resentment -- The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility -- Comment on Claudia Blöser "The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility -- Reply to Wallace -- Can a Spasm Cause an Action? An Argument for Responsibilist Theories of Action -- Autonomous by Default. Assessing "Non-Alienation" in John Christman's Conception of Personal Autonomy -- On the Open Texture of Law -- Selected Thematic Bibliography of Work on Defeasibility in Philosophy and Related Disciplines.
Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology (Mikael Janvid, Klemens Kappel, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Michael Williams), legal philosophy (Frederick Schauer) and ethics and the philosophy of action (Claudia Blöser, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Quante and Katarzyna Paprzycka). The volume ends with an extensive bibliography (by Michael de Araujo Kurth).
9789401210119
Defeasible reasoning.
Law -- Philosophy.
Electronic books.
BC199.D38 -- .D444 2013eb
160
Defeasibility in Philosophy : Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law. - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (258 pages) - Grazer Philosophische Studien ; v.87 . - Grazer Philosophische Studien .
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Knowledge, Ascriptivism and Defeasible Concepts -- Knowledge, Defeasibility, and the Gettier Problem -- The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overriding Case -- Entitlement and Public Accessibility of Epistemic Status -- Strawsonian Epistemology. What Epistemologists Can Learn from "Freedom and Resentment -- The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility -- Comment on Claudia Blöser "The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility -- Reply to Wallace -- Can a Spasm Cause an Action? An Argument for Responsibilist Theories of Action -- Autonomous by Default. Assessing "Non-Alienation" in John Christman's Conception of Personal Autonomy -- On the Open Texture of Law -- Selected Thematic Bibliography of Work on Defeasibility in Philosophy and Related Disciplines.
Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology (Mikael Janvid, Klemens Kappel, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Michael Williams), legal philosophy (Frederick Schauer) and ethics and the philosophy of action (Claudia Blöser, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Quante and Katarzyna Paprzycka). The volume ends with an extensive bibliography (by Michael de Araujo Kurth).
9789401210119
Defeasible reasoning.
Law -- Philosophy.
Electronic books.
BC199.D38 -- .D444 2013eb
160