Corporate Power in Australia : Do the 1% Rule?
Edwards, Lindy.
Corporate Power in Australia : Do the 1% Rule? - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (240 pages)
Front Cover -- Title Page -- About the Author -- About this Book -- Imprint and Copyright Information -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Table 1.1: Proportion of Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.2: Public-interest Case for Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.3: Democratic Momentum Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 2.1: Proportion of Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.2: Public-interest Case for Bank Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.3: Democratic Momentum for Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 3.1: Proportion of Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.2: Public-interest Case for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.3: Democratic Momentum for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 4.1: Proportion of News Corp Australia's Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.2: Public-interest Case for News Corp Australia' Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.3: Democratic Momentum for News Corp Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 5.1: Proportion of Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.2: Public-interest Case for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.3: Democratic Momentum for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 6.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 7.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved. Table 7.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Figure 2.1: Indicative Map of Future of Financial Advice Stakeholders -- Figure 4.1: Indicative Map of Media Stakeholders -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: A Fiercely Contested Battleground -- Chapter 1. The Big Miners and the Mining Tax: The Benchmark Case -- Chapter 2. Banks and the Financial Advice Reforms -- Chapter 3. Telstra and the National Broadband Network -- Chapter 4. News Corp and Media Reform -- Part 2: An Unexpected Turn -- Chapter 5. Supermarkets versus the Farmers -- Chapter 6. Unfair Contracts -- Chapter 7. Abuse of Market Power and the Culpability of Neoliberalism -- Conclusion.
9781925835441
Corporate power-Australia.
Electronic books.
HD2930 / .E393 2020
338.60151949999999
Corporate Power in Australia : Do the 1% Rule? - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (240 pages)
Front Cover -- Title Page -- About the Author -- About this Book -- Imprint and Copyright Information -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Table 1.1: Proportion of Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.2: Public-interest Case for Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.3: Democratic Momentum Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 2.1: Proportion of Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.2: Public-interest Case for Bank Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.3: Democratic Momentum for Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 3.1: Proportion of Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.2: Public-interest Case for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.3: Democratic Momentum for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 4.1: Proportion of News Corp Australia's Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.2: Public-interest Case for News Corp Australia' Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.3: Democratic Momentum for News Corp Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 5.1: Proportion of Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.2: Public-interest Case for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.3: Democratic Momentum for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 6.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 7.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved. Table 7.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Figure 2.1: Indicative Map of Future of Financial Advice Stakeholders -- Figure 4.1: Indicative Map of Media Stakeholders -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: A Fiercely Contested Battleground -- Chapter 1. The Big Miners and the Mining Tax: The Benchmark Case -- Chapter 2. Banks and the Financial Advice Reforms -- Chapter 3. Telstra and the National Broadband Network -- Chapter 4. News Corp and Media Reform -- Part 2: An Unexpected Turn -- Chapter 5. Supermarkets versus the Farmers -- Chapter 6. Unfair Contracts -- Chapter 7. Abuse of Market Power and the Culpability of Neoliberalism -- Conclusion.
9781925835441
Corporate power-Australia.
Electronic books.
HD2930 / .E393 2020
338.60151949999999