Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning.

Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- PART I: THE NATURE OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS -- 1. The Stratification of Linguistic Behavior -- i. Types of Speech Acts -- ii. Illocutionary Acts -- iii. Austin's Classification of Speech Acts -- iv. Austin on the Rhetic-Illocutionary Distinction -- v. Austin on the Illocutionary-Perlocutionary Distinction -- vi. Austin's Characterization of Illocutionary Acts -- vii. Interrelations of Sentential and Illocutionary Acts -- viii. Perlocutionary Acts and Other Speech Acts -- 2. Perlocutionary Intention Theories of Illocutionary Acts -- i. Explicating Illocutionary Act Concepts -- ii. Grice on Speaker Meaning -- iii. Schiffer's Account of Illocutionary Acts -- iv. Criticism of Schiffer's Account -- v. Counterexamples to Schiffer's Account -- 3. The Nature of Illocutionary Acts -- i. Searle's "Non-Defective" Promising -- ii. Taking Responsibility -- iii. Epistemological Complexities -- iv. Blameworthiness and Incorrectness -- v. The Crucial Role of Rules -- vi. Further Modifications of Searle's Analysis -- vii. A New Analysis of Promising -- viii. Extension to Other Illocutionary Acts -- ix. De Re and De Dicto -- x. How to Identify Conditions for Illocutionary Acts -- xi. Illocutionary Rules -- 4. Types of Illocutionary Acts: Commissives, Exercitives, Directives, and Expressives -- i. Prelude: Conventional and Normative Facts -- ii. Commissives, Exercitives, and Verdictives: Preliminary -- iii. The Final Model for Exercitives -- iv. The Final Model for Commissives -- v. Directives -- vi. Expressives -- 5. Assertion and Other Assertives: Completing the Account -- i. The Problem of Assertion -- ii. Assertion as Explicitly Presenting a Proposition -- iii. How This Account Deals with Problems -- iv. Assertive-Nonassertive Overlaps -- v. Kinds of Assertives.

vi. Analysis Patterns for Illocutionary Act Types -- vii. Restrictions on Sentential Vehicles -- viii. Unintentional Illocutionary Acts -- ix. Comparison with Perlocutionary Intention Accounts -- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE MEANING OF SENTENCES -- 6. The Problem of Linguistic Meaning -- i. Meaning: Preliminary -- A. The Concept of Meaning -- B. What I'm Looking for in a Theory of Meaning -- ii. Use as the Key to Meaning -- iii. Sentence Meaning as Primary -- iv. Sentence Meaning as Illocutionary Act Potential -- v. Sentence Meaning and Perlocutionary Intentions -- vi. Two Difficulties in the Illocutionary Act Potential Theory -- vii. Intensifying the Difficulty -- viii. Matching Illocutionary Act Types -- ix. Illocutionary Rules -- 7. Illocutionary Act Potential and Illocutionary Rules -- i. IA Potential as Subjection to Illocutionary Rules -- ii. Linguistic Meaning as Rule Govemance -- iii. Some Versions of Semantic Rules -- iv. Progressive Complication of Illocutionary Rules -- v. How to Handle Ellipticity and Singular Reference -- vi. Reference, Ellipticity, and R'ing as Rule Subjection -- vii. IA Analysis in Terms of Rule Subjection and in Terms of R'ing -- viii. Some Additional Problems for IA Analysis -- ix. IA's, I-Rules, IA Potential, and Sentence Meaning -- x. Sample I-Rules and IA Analyses -- xi. How I-Rules Make Communication Possible -- xii. Speaker Meaning -- 8. The Status of Illocutionary Rules -- i. Summary of the Foregoing -- ii. Regulative and Constitutive Rules -- iii. Unformulated Rules -- iv. Rules and Conventions -- v. Do I-Rules Exist? -- vi. Drawing Boundaries around I-Act and I-Rule -- vii. The Meaning of Subsentential Units -- 9. The IA Potential Theory of Meaning and Its Alternatives -- i. Preview -- ii. Initial Plausibility of the Theory -- iii. Efficacy of the Theory in Application -- iv. Replies to Objections.

v. Mapping Alternative Theories -- vi. Words or Sentences as Fundamental -- vii. Naive Referential Theories -- viii. More Sophisticated Referential Theories -- ix. Truth Conditional Approaches -- x. Attempts to Get Beyond Assertion I -- xi. Attempts to Get Beyond Assertion II -- xii. Conclusion -- Appendix -- Bibliography -- Index.

What is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is the question that William P. Alston addresses in this major contribution to the philosophy of language.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.