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Positive Political Theory I : Collective Preference.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Michigan Studies in Political Analysis SeriesPublisher: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 1998Copyright date: ©2000Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (225 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780472022465
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Positive Political Theory IDDC classification:
  • 320.011
LOC classification:
  • JA71
Online resources:
Contents:
Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1. Choice and Preference -- 1.1 Preference-driven choice -- 1.2 Rationalizable choice -- 1.3 Application: The unitary actor assumption -- 1.4 Transitive rationalizability -- 1.5 Application: Choice of coalitional partners -- 1.6 Discussion -- 1.7 Exercises -- 1.8 Further reading -- 2. Power and Collective Rationality -- 2.1 Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem -- 2.2 Application: Choosing a representative -- 2.3 Quasi-transitive and acyclic rules -- 2.4 Decisive sets and filters -- 2.5 Collective choice rules -- 2.6 Discussion -- 2.7 Exercises -- 2.8 Further reading -- 3. Restricting Outcomes -- 3.1 Decisive coalitions and simple rules -- 3.2 Acyclic simple rules -- 3.3 Application: A comparison of simple rules -- 3.4 Voting rules -- 3.5 Counting rules -- 3.6 Discussion -- 3.7 Exercises -- 3.8 Further reading -- 4. Restricting Preferences -- 4.1 Single-peaked preferences -- 4.2 Core characterization -- 4.3 One-dimensional outcome space -- 4.4 Application: Public goods provision -- 4.5 Order-restricted preferences -- 4.6 Application: Collective choice of tax-rates -- 4.7 Discussion -- 4.8 Exercises -- 4.9 Further reading -- 5. The Spatial Model -- 5.1 Choosing from a continuum -- 5.2 Core existence -- 5.3 Application: Distributive politics -- 5.4 Characterizing core points -- 5.5 Discussion -- 5.6 Exercises -- 5.7 Further reading -- 6. Instability and Chaos -- 6.1 Generic nonexistence of core points -- 6.2 Application: Distributive politics revisited -- 6.3 Cycles -- 6.4 Discussion -- 6.5 Exercises -- 6.6 Further reading -- 7. Summary and Conclusions -- 7.1 Social choice -- 7.2 Game theory -- Bibliography -- Index.
Summary: A definitive, comprehensive, and analytically sophisticated treatment of the theory of collective preference.
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Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1. Choice and Preference -- 1.1 Preference-driven choice -- 1.2 Rationalizable choice -- 1.3 Application: The unitary actor assumption -- 1.4 Transitive rationalizability -- 1.5 Application: Choice of coalitional partners -- 1.6 Discussion -- 1.7 Exercises -- 1.8 Further reading -- 2. Power and Collective Rationality -- 2.1 Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem -- 2.2 Application: Choosing a representative -- 2.3 Quasi-transitive and acyclic rules -- 2.4 Decisive sets and filters -- 2.5 Collective choice rules -- 2.6 Discussion -- 2.7 Exercises -- 2.8 Further reading -- 3. Restricting Outcomes -- 3.1 Decisive coalitions and simple rules -- 3.2 Acyclic simple rules -- 3.3 Application: A comparison of simple rules -- 3.4 Voting rules -- 3.5 Counting rules -- 3.6 Discussion -- 3.7 Exercises -- 3.8 Further reading -- 4. Restricting Preferences -- 4.1 Single-peaked preferences -- 4.2 Core characterization -- 4.3 One-dimensional outcome space -- 4.4 Application: Public goods provision -- 4.5 Order-restricted preferences -- 4.6 Application: Collective choice of tax-rates -- 4.7 Discussion -- 4.8 Exercises -- 4.9 Further reading -- 5. The Spatial Model -- 5.1 Choosing from a continuum -- 5.2 Core existence -- 5.3 Application: Distributive politics -- 5.4 Characterizing core points -- 5.5 Discussion -- 5.6 Exercises -- 5.7 Further reading -- 6. Instability and Chaos -- 6.1 Generic nonexistence of core points -- 6.2 Application: Distributive politics revisited -- 6.3 Cycles -- 6.4 Discussion -- 6.5 Exercises -- 6.6 Further reading -- 7. Summary and Conclusions -- 7.1 Social choice -- 7.2 Game theory -- Bibliography -- Index.

A definitive, comprehensive, and analytically sophisticated treatment of the theory of collective preference.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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