Game Theory in Jurisprudence.

Cover -- Title page -- Table of contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- Part I Introduction to game theory -- Chapter 1. The basics of game theory -- 1. Twelve questions about game theory -- 2. What is game theory? -- 3. What are the branches of game theory? -- 4. What are the functions of game theory? -- 5. What is a game? -- 6. What assumptions does game theory make regarding players? -- 6.1. Instrumental rationality -- 6.2. Common knowledge of rationality -- 7. What does game theory assume about players' knowledge? -- 8. How can games be presented? -- 9. What are the main types of games? -- 10. What are the basic solution concepts of non-cooperative game theory? -- 10.1. Dominance -- 10.2. Nash equilibrium -- 10.3. Rollback equilibrium -- 10.4. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium -- 10.5. Sequential equilibrium -- 10.6. Other refinements -- 10.7. The Minimax Theorem -- 11. What is cooperative game theory? -- 11.1. The core -- 11.2. The theory of stable sets - the NM-solution -- 12. What is bargaining theory? -- 12.1. The bargaining problem -- 12.2. The Nash solution -- 12.3. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution -- 13. What is evolutionary game theory? -- Part II: Game theory and general issues in jurisprudence -- Chapter 2. The nature of law -- 1. Law as a means for solving collective action problems -- 2. A game-theoretic account of collective action problems -- 2.1. Non-iterated games -- 2.1.1. The first pure type of collective action problems: egoism as an obstacle for a collective action -- 2.1.1.1. The Prisoner's Dilemma -- 2.1.1.2. The Chicken -- 2.1.2. The second pure type of collective action problems: coordination difficulties as the main obstacle for collective action -- 2.1.3. Mixed type of collective action problems -- 2.2. Iterated games -- 2.3. Contributions of evolutionary game theory to understanding collective action problems.

3. Three interpretations of the account of law as a means for solving collective action problems -- 3.1. Three types of legal norms -- 3.2. Three interpretations of the phrase 'Law is a means for solving collective action problems' -- 4. The problem of legal normativity -- 5. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 3. Game theory and legal interpretation -- 1. The notion of legal interpretation -- 2. The semantic limits of legal interpretation -- 3. The criteria for selecting a proper meaning -- 3.1. Intentionalism -- 3.2. Non-intentionalism -- 4. The strategic reasons for failing to select a proper meaning -- 5. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 4. Legal rights -- 1. Six questions about legal rights -- 2. Two ways of justifying rights -- 3. The nature of rights -- 4. The function of rights -- 5. The types of rights -- 6. The justification of inalienable right -- 7. The emergence of fundamental rights -- 8. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 5. Justice -- 1. Game theory and the philosophical problems related to the concept of justice -- 2. The circumstances of justice -- 3. Justice as mutual advantage or justice as impartiality? -- 3.1. Game theory as a tool for explicating the distributive rule of justice as mutual advantage -- 3.2. Game theory as a tool for criticising justice as mutual advantage -- 3.3. Game theory as a tool for justifying justice as mutual advantage -- 3.4. An evaluation of justice as mutual advantage -- 4. Justice as impartiality: the utilitarian justice or the Rawlsian justice? -- 5. Concluding remarks -- Part III Game theory and specific issues in jurisprudence -- Chapter 6. Contract law -- 1. The main problems of contract law -- 2. Contractual relationships between homines oeconomici -- 3. Contractual relationships between homines oeconomici and homines morales -- 4. Contractual relationships modelled by repeated games.

5. Contract law and cooperative game theory -- 6. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 7. Tort law -- 1. Two theories of tort law -- 2. In search of a cost-effective regime of liability -- 3. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 8. Property law -- 1. Two questions about property law -- 2. The origins of the institution of private property -- 3. The justification of the institution of private property -- 4. Concluding remarks -- Epilogue: Law and Economics and the projects of the naturalization of law -- 1. Naturalization sensu stricto and naturalization sensu largo -- 2. A critique of strong naturalization -- 3. Naturalization sensu largo: American legal psychological legal realism realism and -- 4. Law and Economics and the naturalization of law -- 5. Summary -- 6. Case study: reductionist accounts of justice -- 6.1. Introductory remarks -- 6.2. The conceptual reduction -- 6.3. The genealogical reduction -- 6.4. The psychological reduction -- 6.5. Reductionist accounts of justice in Law and Economics -- 6.6. Concluding remarks -- Appendix: Rationality and emotions -- 1. The vagueness of the concept of the 'rationality of emotions' -- 2. Intrinsic rationality of emotions -- 2.1. Token emotions -- 2.2. Types of emotions -- 3. Instrumental rationality of emotions -- 4. Adaptive rationality of emotions -- 5. Summary -- References -- Index of names -- Back cover.

Game theory is a branch of mathematics that studies strategic interactions, i.e., interactions which involve more than one agent and in which each agent makes her/his decision while striving to predict the decisions of other agents. Game theory has been successfully applied in many areas of both the natural and social sciences, and it is the belief of this book's author that it can also be gainfully invoked in the area of legal philosophy. In this book, Wojciech Zaluski analyzes legal-philosophical concepts - such as legal interpretation, justice, legal rights, contract law, tort law, and property law - through the lens of game theory. The book appeals mainly to game theory's conceptual rather than the technical side, and intertwines game-theoretical analysis with the philosophical. It will be accessible to a wider circle of readers interested in legal and moral philosophy.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.