Handbook of Safety Principles.

Intro -- Handbook of Safety Principles -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Competition, Overlap, and Conflicts -- 1.2 A New Level in the Study of Safety Principles -- 1.3 Metaprinciples of Safety -- 1.4 Other Ways to Characterize Safety Principles -- 1.5 Conflicts Between Safety Principles -- 1.6 When Can Safety Principles Be Broken? -- 1.7 Safety in Context -- References -- 2 PREVIEW -- 2.1 Part I: Safety Reserves -- 2.2 Part II: Information and Control -- 2.3 Part III: Demonstrability -- 2.4 Part IV: Optimization -- 2.5 Part V: Organizational Principles and Practices -- Part I Safety Reserves -- 3 Resilience Engineering and the Future of Safety Management -- 3.1 On the Origins of Resilience -- 3.2 The Resilience Engineering Understanding of "Resilience" -- 3.3 The Four Potentials for Resilience Performance -- 3.4 Safety Management Systems -- 3.5 Developing Definitions of Resilience -- 3.6 Managing the Potentials for Resilient Performance -- 3.6.1 Organizations of the First Kind -- 3.6.2 Organizations of the Second Kind -- 3.6.3 Organizations of the Third Kind -- 3.6.4 Organizations of the Fourth Kind -- 3.7 Resilience Management: LP-HI OR HP-LI? -- References -- 4 DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Underlying Theory and Theoretical Assumptions -- 4.2.1 Definitions and Terminology -- 4.3 Redundancy, Diversity, and Separation Principles -- 4.3.1 Principle of Successive Barriers and Reducing Consequences -- 4.3.2 Principle of Accident Prevention and Mitigation -- 4.3.3 Classification of Barriers -- 4.3.4 Safety Classification -- 4.3.5 Overall Safety Goals and Risk Acceptance Criteria vs. Defense-in-Depth -- 4.4 Use and Implementation -- 4.4.1 Nuclear Power Plant Safety -- 4.4.2 Chemical Industry -- 4.4.3 Information Technology Security -- 4.4.4 Railway Safety -- 4.4.5 Automobile Safety.

4.5 Empirical Research on use and Efficiency -- 4.6 Weaknesses, Limitations, and Criticism -- 4.7 Relations to Other Safety Principles -- References -- Further Reading -- 5 Safety Barriers -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.1.1 Classical and Radical Definitions of Barriers -- 5.1.2 Examples -- 5.2 Origin and Theoretical Background -- 5.2.1 Energy and Sequence Models -- 5.2.2 Extended Models -- 5.3 Definitions and Terminology -- 5.3.1 Examples of Barrier Definitions -- 5.3.2 Barriers and Barrier Systems -- 5.3.3 Alternatives to the Barrier Concept -- 5.3.4 Safety Functions -- 5.3.5 Conclusion -- 5.4 Classification of Barriers -- 5.4.1 General Considerations -- 5.4.2 System Level Classification -- 5.4.3 Classification Related to Accident Sequence -- 5.4.4 Physical and Non-physical Barriers -- 5.4.5 Administrative and Human Barriers -- 5.4.6 Passive and Active Barriers -- 5.4.7 Combined Models -- 5.4.8 Purpose of Barriers -- 5.5 Methods for Analysis of Safety Barriers -- 5.5.1 Energy Analysis -- 5.5.2 Event Tree Analysis -- 5.5.3 Fault Tree Analysis -- 5.5.4 Safety Barrier Diagrams -- 5.5.5 Management Oversight and Risk Tree -- 5.5.6 MTO Event Investigation -- 5.5.7 Safety Function Analysis -- 5.5.8 Reliability Techniques -- 5.6 Quality and Efficiency of Barriers -- 5.6.1 Design and Installation of Barriers -- 5.6.2 Management of Barrier Systems During Operation -- 5.6.3 Maintenance of Barriers -- 5.6.4 Summary of Barrier Management Principles -- 5.7 Discussion and Conclusions -- 5.7.1 The Classical and Radical Meaning -- 5.7.2 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 5.7.3 General Conclusions -- 5.7.4 Relations to the Other Chapters -- References -- 6 Factors and Margins of Safety -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Origin and History -- 6.3 Definitions and Terminology -- 6.4 Underlying Theory and Theoretical Assumptions -- 6.4.1 Structural Engineering.

6.4.2 Toxicology -- 6.5 Use and Implementation -- 6.5.1 Three Types of Numerical Safety Reserves -- 6.5.2 How Safety Factors are Determined -- 6.6 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 6.6.1 Engineering -- 6.6.2 Toxicology -- 6.7 Weaknesses, Limitations, and Criticism -- 6.8 Relations to Other Safety Principles -- 6.8.1 Probabilistic Analysis -- 6.8.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Further Reading -- Part II Information and Control -- 7 Experience Feedback -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.1.1 Example -- 7.2 Origin and History -- 7.3 Definitions -- 7.4 Underlying Theories and Assumptions -- 7.4.1 Feedback Cycle for the Control of Anything -- 7.4.2 Safety Information Systems -- 7.4.3 The Diagnostic Process -- 7.4.4 Knowledge Management -- 7.5 Use and Implementation -- 7.5.1 Safety Practice in an Operational Setting -- 7.5.2 Risk Assessment -- 7.5.3 Transfer of Experience to New Construction Projects -- 7.5.4 Transfer of Experience from the Users to Design -- 7.6 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 7.7 Relations to Other Safety Principles -- 7.7.1 Safety Management -- 7.7.2 Resilience Engineering -- 7.7.3 Safety Indicators -- 7.7.4 Safety Culture -- References -- Further Reading -- 8 RISK AND SAFETY INDICATORS -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Origin and History -- 8.3 Definitions and Terminology -- 8.4 Underlying Theory and Theoretical Assumptions -- 8.4.1 Past, Present, and Future Safety -- 8.4.2 Outcome Indicators -- 8.4.3 Risk Models and Precursor Events -- 8.4.4 Status of Physical and Procedural Controls -- 8.4.5 Safe Behaviors -- 8.4.6 Amount and Quality of Safety Activity -- 8.4.7 Organizational Drivers and Attributes -- 8.4.8 Variability -- 8.5 Use and Implementation -- 8.5.1 Metrics Collection -- 8.5.2 Incentives and Accountability -- 8.5.3 Benchmarking and Comparison.

8.5.4 Safety Management System Performance Monitoring -- 8.6 Empirical Research on Use and Efficacy -- 8.6.1 Usage of Indicators -- 8.6.2 Efficacy of Indicators -- 8.7 Weaknesses, Limitations, and Criticism -- 8.7.1 Underreporting and Distortion -- 8.7.2 The Regulator Paradox and Estimation of Rare Events -- 8.7.3 Confusion Between Process Safety and Personal Safety Indicators -- 8.7.4 Unintended Consequences of Indirect Measurement -- 8.8 Relations to Other Safety Principles -- 8.8.1 Ensurance Principles -- 8.8.2 Assessment and Assurance Principles -- References -- 9 Principles of Human Factors Engineering -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Principle 1: HFE is Design Thinking -- 9.2.1 Description -- 9.2.2 Theoretical Foundation -- 9.2.3 Use and Implementation -- 9.2.4 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 9.3 Principle 2: HFE Studies Human as a Manifold Entity -- 9.3.1 Description -- 9.3.2 Theoretical Foundations -- 9.3.3 Use and Implementation -- 9.3.4 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 9.4 Principle 3: HFE Focuses on Technology in Use -- 9.4.1 Description -- 9.4.2 Theoretical Foundations -- 9.4.3 Use and Implementation -- 9.4.4 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 9.5 Principle 4: Safety is Achieved Through Continuous HFE -- 9.5.1 Description -- 9.5.2 Theoretical Foundation -- 9.5.3 Use and Implementation -- 9.5.4 Empirical Research on Use and Efficiency -- 9.6 Relation to Other Safety Principles -- 9.7 Limitations -- 9.8 Conclusions -- References -- Further Reading -- 10 Safety Automation -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.1.1 Purpose of Safety Automation -- 10.1.2 Functions of I&amp -- C Systems -- 10.1.3 Allocation of Functions between Humans and Automation -- 10.2 Origin and History -- 10.2.1 Roots of Safety Automation -- 10.2.2 Systems Design -- 10.2.3 Typical Design Projects -- 10.2.4 Analog and Digital I&amp -- C.

10.3 Definitions and Terminology -- 10.3.1 System Life Cycles -- 10.3.2 Process and Product -- 10.3.3 Phases of Design -- 10.3.4 Operations -- 10.4 Underlying Theories and Assumptions -- 10.4.1 Systems of Systems -- 10.4.2 Building Reliability with Unreliable Parts -- 10.4.3 Reusability of Designs -- 10.4.4 Vendor Capability -- 10.4.5 Project Management -- 10.4.6 Regulatory Oversight -- 10.5 Use and Implementation -- 10.5.1 From Systems Design to I&amp -- C Design -- 10.5.2 Physical Realizations of I&amp -- C -- 10.5.3 Initial Considerations -- 10.5.4 I&amp -- C Design -- 10.5.5 Practices in Different Domains -- 10.6 Research on Use and Efficiency -- 10.6.1 Estimates of Project Cost and Duration -- 10.6.2 Support Systems for Design and Construction -- 10.6.3 Benefits of Using Safety Principles -- 10.7 Weaknesses, Limitations, and Criticism -- 10.7.1 What is Safe Enough? -- 10.7.2 Quality of Design -- 10.7.3 Field Programmable Gate Arrays -- 10.7.4 Cyber Security -- 10.7.5 Regulatory Acceptance -- 10.8 Relations to Other Safety Principles -- 10.8.1 Safety Reserves -- 10.8.2 Information and Control -- 10.8.3 Demonstrability -- 10.8.4 Optimization -- 10.8.5 Organizational Principles and Practices -- 10.9 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- 11 Risk Communication -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.1.1 Example 1 -- 11.1.2 Risk Perception, Awareness, and Communication -- 11.1.3 This Chapter -- 11.2 The Origin and History of Risk Communication as Academic Field -- 11.2.1 Example 2 -- 11.2.2 Changing Notions about Communication -- 11.2.3 Example 3 -- 11.2.4 Conclusion -- 11.3 Underlying Assumptions, Concepts and Empirical Data on Risk Communication Models -- 11.3.1 Information versus Communication -- 11.3.2 Risk Communication Aims -- 11.3.3 Diagnostic Risk Communication Studies -- 11.3.4 Social Amplification of Risk -- 11.3.5 Trust in Risk Communication.

11.3.6 Socio-Cognitive Models.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.